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Pension Plans and the Prospects of Corporate Self-Regulation
Michael E. Murphy*
I. INTRODUCTION
The concept of corporate self-regulation, embedded in the New
Deal legislation that forms the foundation of securities law,1 is un-
likely to draw criticism in principle from any quarter. For corporate
reformers, it carries the scent of industrial democracy; for the business
community, it promises greater freedom from government interfer-
ence; and for legal scholars familiar with regulatory jurisprudence, it
represents a response to the complexity of modern society that may
advance the objectives of prescriptive law while lightening the burden
of external controls.2 But there is no agreed path to the El Dorado of
corporate self-regulation or even any assurance that it can be found.
When New Deal legislation failed to prevent the scandals of the 1990s,
the response of Congress was to spurn the elusive alternative of cor-
porate self-regulation and to impose a stronger set of external controls
in the form of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.
In this article, I will explore how the institutional environment of
pension funds raises obstacles to the goal of corporate self-regulation.
The question is prompted by the size of corporate stock ownership by
pension funds, the unique issues affecting this category of institutional
investor, and the uncertain promise of a shareholder-based system of
corporate self-regulation. Pension funds now hold approximately 24
* Judicial Attorney, California Court of Appeal, First District, 1987-2006; Ph.D., University
of California, Berkeley; J.D., Stanford University; B.A., Harvard University; Lecturer, Geogra-
phy Department, University of Texas at Austin, 1986-1987; member of California Bar and Ore-
gon Bar.
1. See Louis Loss & JOEL SELIGMAN, FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES REGULATION 35-47
(STH ED. 2004). In an excellent overview of securities law, the authors note that a "major
theme" of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 is "self-regulation under the general aegis of the
SEC." Id. at 34. The self-regulating organizations created by the 1934 Act include the national
securities exchanges and the National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc. In addition, the
required filings of annual and quarterly reports, as well as the prescribed disclosures in proxy
solicitation, have a self-regulatory effect in that they provide information needed for market
forces or the procedures of corporate governance to provide needed corrections in corporate
policies.
2. This theory was advanced most notably by Gunther Teubner, Substantive and Reflexive
Elements in Modern Law, 17 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 239 (1975).
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percent of the total U.S. equity market3 and 29 percent of the equity
in the 1000 largest corporations.4 Roughly 40 percent of these equity
investments are found in public pension funds for state, local and fed-
eral employees, and the balance in various forms of private pension
funds, including the rapidly growing sector of 401(k) plans. 5
Private pension plans, with certain exceptions, are covered by the
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), which
poses fiduciary issues relating only to this category of institutional in-
vestors. These issues are a major focus of this article and are dis-
cussed in three distinct contexts. ERISA and parallel provisions of
state law also give rise to issues of redundant regulation, discussed in a
separate section, because they apply to plans that are subject to over-
lapping provisions of securities law. Other anomalies peculiar to the
pension field are found in legislation relating to federal and union
plans.
Although the notion of pension fund activism has stirred populist
expectations, 6 the pension funds actively engaged in corporate moni-
toring are in fact a minority of a minority composed of some large
public pension funds, a portion of the small group of Taft-Hartley
funds, and a single unique institution, TIAA-CREF. In general, pen-
sion funds exhibit the pattern of shareholder passivity displayed by
other institutional investors. The considerable body of literature ana-
lyzing this phenomenon uniformly recognizes that it is linked to dis-
3. See THE CONFERENCE BOARD, THE 2005 INSTITUTIONAL INVESTMENT REPORT 28-29
(2005); SECURITIES INDUSTRY ASSOCIATION, SECURITY INDUSTRY FACT BOOK 69 (2005). The
Conference Board offers a well recognized source of data, but the 2005 report does not include
federal plans or provide a breakdown of the category of private insured pension plans. The
figure of 24 percent is based on The Conference Board data for state and local funds and private
trusteed plans (9.7 percent and 12.7 percent, respectively), plus .6 percent for federal plans and
an estimated of 1 percent for TIAA-CREF, the largest pension plan provider, which belongs in
the category of pension funds (rather than insured plans) for the purpose of this article. The
figure for federal funds is taken from Securities Industry Association's Fact Book; the estimate
for TIAA-CREF assumes that half of its $380 billion assets are in equities, a figure representa-
tive of pensions as a whole, and assumes an equity market of 18 trillion. See TIAA-CREF,
Annual Reports & Financial Statements, at www.tiaa-cref.org/about/governance/corporate/top-
ics/annual-reports.html.
4. The institutional ownership of the top 1,000 U.S. corporations was 69.4 percent in 2004.
THE CONFERENCE BOARD, supra note 3, at 36. The portion held by pension funds is calculated in
the manner described infra note 3.
5. See SECURITIES INDUSTRY ASSOCIA7ION, supra note 3, at 69 (equity holdings of state and
local funds and federal funds) and infra pp. 27 and 46 (breakdown of private pension plan
holdings).
6. MARJORIE KELLY, THE DIVINE RIGHT OF CAPITAL: DETHRONING THE CORPORATE ARIS-
TOCRACY 182 (2001); THOMAS GEOGHEGAN, WHICH SIDE ARE YOU ON? 242-246 (1991) (criti-
quing the idea); Jeffrey N. Gordon, Employees, Pensions, and the New Economic Order, 97
COLUM. L. REV. 1519, 1539 n.64 (collecting sources).
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persed ownership and high investment turnover, which reduce the
shareholder incentive to engage in corporate monitoring. However,
the phenomenon is specifically American in origin - the same degree
of shareholder passivity is not found in the United Kingdom and is
entirely absent in other countries. The institutional environment
clearly must be considered for a full understanding of shareholder
passivity, though scholars differ in their assessment of its importance.7
This article offers a contribution to existing literature by giving pen-
sion funds the detailed attention that their unique regulatory context
demands.
The first section introduces the statutory requirements of diversifi-
cation, which are often linked to shareholder passivity, and discusses
the benefits of applying these requirements in light of modern portfo-
lio theory and broader concepts of fiduciary responsibility. This sub-
ject leads directly to issues of redundant securities regulation. I turn
next to the issue of fiduciary structure in a section on employer-di-
rected pension plans and find a compelling model for reform in the
British Pension Act 1995. The succeeding section on union plans
notes historical anomalies of the Taft-Hartley Act, but generally leads
to the same considerations affecting other employer-directed plans.
The strange case of the Federal Employees Savings Plan deserves a
separate comment. Lastly, I discuss the fiduciary structure of 401(k)
plans, which is increasingly becoming the dominant form of pension
plan. Considerations of corporate governance are of distinctly secon-
dary policy importance here, but passivity in corporate monitoring
may be viewed as one adverse consequence, among others, of a dys-
functional system.
Pension funds today operate in what might generously be described
as a weak self-regulatory system of shareholder monitoring. Although
shareholders must approve extraordinary measures such as mergers,
and large institutional investors can sometimes successfully target par-
ticularly vulnerable managements or promote widely accepted corpo-
rate governance reforms, the self-regulatory impulses generated by
shareholders are still sporadic and marginal in effect. In the last sec-
tion of this essay, I consider whether pension fund reforms suggested
by my earlier discussion can be regarded as a step toward a more ro-
7. Several studies in the late 1980s and early 1990s explored the institutional causes of share-
holder passivity. See, e.g., Alfred E. Conrad, Beyond Managerialism: Investor Capitalism?, 22 U.
MICH. J.L. REFORM 117 (1988); Bernard S. Black, Shareholder Passivity Reexamined, 89 MICH.
L. REV. 520 (1994). Roe has recently studied the question in an international context. MARK J.
ROE, POLITICAL DETERMINANTS OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, POLITICAL CONTEXT, CORPO-
RATE IMPACT (2003).
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bust system of corporate self-regulation that might offer an alternative
to the sort of external controls exemplified by the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act. I discuss the requirements of self-regulation in management the-
ory, the potential value of a pension fund voice in corporate govern-
ance, and the need for multiple approaches and institutional
innovations to create a more effective system of shareholder-based
corporate self-regulation. I leave open the question of whether a
stronger self-regulatory regime can in fact evolve through a process of
incremental reform.
It will become clear the pension funds are by no means the key to
corporate self-regulation - but then there is no one key. I offer the
article in the hope that the close examination of this subject will open
windows to larger issues and suggest modifications in the regulatory
environment of pension funds that could gain importance in combina-
tion with other reforms.
II. INSTITUTIONAL CONSTRAINTS ON CORPORATE MONITORING
A. The Diversification Rule of ERISA
An unusual triumph of the reforming impulse in American politics,
the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 created a
comprehensive system of federal regulation of private pensions. The
legislation was motivated chiefly by concern about unfunded plans
and unvested pension benefits. As remedies, Congress imposed
mandatory vesting and minimum funding rules, and created an insur-
ance system for defined benefit plans by establishing the Pension Ben-
efit Guaranty Corporation.8 The complex legislation, however,
contained extensive provisions lying outside the main legislative pur-
poses. Two such provisions have an important impact on the role of
pension plans in corporate governance: the structure of fiduciary re-
sponsibility and the diversification rule. The fiduciary structure of
pension plans presents a story of unintended consequences that we
will take up later. The diversification rule similarly provides the con-
text for later sections, but it also has a direct, and problematic, con-
nection with the phenomenon of shareholder passivity.
Diversification implies dispersed share ownership that reduces the in-
centive for corporate monitoring of individual companies. For this
reason, some distinguished scholars stressed the connection between
8. Excellent accounts of the political history and legislative purpose of ERISA can be found
in: JAMES A. WOOTEN, THE EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT INCOME SECURITY ACT OF 1974: A POLrTI-
CAL HISTORY (2004) and JACOB S. HACKER, THE DIVIDED WELFARE STATE: THE BATTLE OVER
PUBLIC AND PRIVATE SOCIAL BENEFITS IN THE UNITED STATES 145-153 (2002).
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the diversification rule and shareholder passivity.9 But I will argue
that the most vital issues concern interpretation of the diversification
rule. If properly construed, the rule is compatible with a regime of
enhanced corporate monitoring.
The diversification rule appears in section 404 of ERISA, a provi-
sion that has been aptly described as embodying "a carefully tailored
law of trusts, including the familiar requirements of undivided loyalty
to beneficiaries, the prudent man rule, the rule requiring diversifica-
tion of investments and the requirement that fiduciaries comply with
the provisions of plan documents to the extent that they are not incon-
sistent with the Act."10 The statutory language requires a fiduciary to
"discharge his duties with respect to a plan . . . by diversifying the
investments of the plan so as to minimize the risk of large losses, un-
less under the circumstances it is clearly prudent not to do so.""
Other provisions exempt employer securities from the diversification
rule t2 and establish different (and decidedly lax) requirements for em-
ployee-directed plans.1 3
The relevant legislative history indicates that Congress intended to
federalize the existing law of trust by adopting Section 404.14 This
interpretation of legislative intent carries the implication that the stat-
ute can properly be applied in light of evolving principles of trust law.
ERISA was in fact enacted at a time when a revolution in financial
theory, known as modern portfolio theory, was gaining general ac-
ceptance among investment professionals. The American Law Insti-
tute saw fit to issue the Third Restatement of Trust only about twenty
years after the publication of Second Restatement so as to incorporate
the new financial principles. 15
9. See ROE, supra note 7, at 38; Black, supra note 7, at 553-556; John C. Coffee, Jr., Liquidity
Versus Control: The Institutional Investor as Corporate Monitor, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1277, 1355-
1357 (1991).
10. Eaves v. Penn, 587 F.2d 453, 457 (10th Cir. 1978).
11. 29 U.S.C. § 1104 (a)(1)(C) (2007).
12. ERISA § 407(a)(2) provides that a plan may not acquire holdings of employer securities
exceeding 10% of the assets of the plan, but sections 407(b)(1) and (d)(3) allow plans to avoid
this limitation by authorizing investment in employer securities subject to certain restrictions.
See 29 U.S.C. § 1107(a)(2), (b)(1) and (d)(3) (2007).
13. See discussion infra pp. 52-55.
14. See H.R. REP. No. 93-1280 (1974) reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5084; Daniel Fischell &
John H. Langbein, ERISA's Fundamental Contradiction: The Exclusive Benefit Rule, 55 U. CHI.
L. REV. 1105, 1108 n.15; Varity Corp v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 496 (1996).
15. Restatement (Third) of Trusts was written in 1990 and published in 1992; Restatement
(Second) of Trusts was issued in 1958-1959. The tendency of courts and legislatures to lag behind
investment professions in accepting modern portfolio theory is discussed in Jeffrey N. Gordon,
The Puzzling Persistence of the Constrained Prudent Man Rule, 62 N.Y.U. L. REV. 52 (1987);
20071
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Modern portfolio theory adds precision and analytical clarity to the
time-honored rule of diversification. 16 It proceeds from the premise
that individual stocks in a portfolio are subject to risks that are nega-
tively correlated, that is, an event that will cause the rise in the price
of one stock will tend to depress the price of another. For example,
high oil prices may be good for oil companies but bad for airlines.
The object of diversification is to minimize risks that are specific to a
particular company, or perhaps a segment of an industry. From the
perspective of modern portfolio theory, firm-specific risk represents
an impermissible speculation that can be offset, or eliminated, by
combining stocks subject to distinct risks without reducing the average
expected return. A skillfully diversified portfolio is still subject to
market-wide risks caused by vicissitudes of the economy, but these
market risks can be set at a desired level by investing in different cate-
gories of assets with different risks and probable returns. Thus, the
investment of a segment of a portfolio in cash or treasury bonds will
lower portfolio risk as well as the expected return.
The analysis of modern portfolio theory strongly supports the prin-
ciple that diversification is a mandatory practice of prudent investing.
Moreover, where past volatility of securities is known, the theory pro-
vides a method to precisely calculate the probable benefits of diversi-
fication. It turns out that most of the benefit in reducing firm-specific
risks can be achieved with relatively few stocks. According to a lead-
ing text, "the improvement is slight when the number of securities is
increased beyond, say 20 or 30. ''17
A Seventh Circuit decision contains dicta approving modern portfo-
lio theory18 and a Fifth Circuit decision recognizes the principle of
combining negatively correlated risks,19 but most case law on point
has concerned the peculiar problems of small pension funds. Weiss
Edward C. Halback, Jr., Trust Investment Law in the Third Restatement, 27 REAL PROP. PROB. &
TR. J. 407, 412-413 (1992).
16. For introductions to modem portfolio theory, see JONATHAN R. MACEY, AN INTRODUC-
TION TO MODERN FINANCIAL THEORY (American College of Trust and Estate Counsel Founda-
tion, 1991); RICHARD A. BREALEY & STEWART C. MYERS, THE PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE
FINANCE 148-166 (5th Ed. 1996); HARVEY E. BINES AND STEVE THEL, INVESTMENT MANAGE-
MENT LAW AND REGULATION ch.7 (2d ed. 2004).
17. BREALEY & MYERS, supra note 16, at 154.
18. Leigh v. Engle, 858 F.2d 361, 368 (7th Cir. 1988) (acknowledging that its "discussion is
greatly simplified" and refers to a standard text on financial theory as providing a "more techni-
cal explanation.")
19. Laborers Nat. Pension v. N. Trust Quantitative Advisors, 173 F.3d 313, 321 (5th Cir. 1999)
(holding that investment in interest-only mortgage-backed securities "was reasonably designed
as part of the Fund's portfolio to further the purposes of diversification as a hedge against possi-
ble interest rate hikes and consequent declines in values of fixed income securities").
[Vol. 5:503
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and Sgaraglino express concern that the judicial difficulty in applying
the diversification rule to small plans has generated confusion as to
the basic principles applying to all plans,20 but the precedents that
they discuss 21 should probably be viewed only as pointing to the need
to develop distinct principles governing small plans.22
The Commission on Uniform Laws has followed the Third Restate-
ment of Trusts in embracing modern portfolio theory. The comment
to Section 3 of the Uniform Prudent Investor Act, adopted in 44 states
and the District of Columbia, pointedly endorses modern portfolio
theory and cites the pertinent provisions of the Third Restatement. 23
The Uniform Management of Public Employees Retirement Systems
Act, so far adopted in only two states, similarly directs the trustee to
consider "the role that each investment ... plays within the overall
portfolio of the retirement program," and the comment offers a brief
explanation of modern portfolio theory with references to more de-
tailed sources.24
Most importantly, five years after the enactment of ERISA, the De-
partment of Labor formulated a statement of the fiduciary's invest-
ment duties that adopts a total portfolio approach to prudent
20. See Deborah M. Weiss & Marc A. Sgaraglino, Prudent Risks for Anxious Workers 1996
Wis. L. REV. 1175, 1186 (1996) (noting that the courts have broadly construed the statutory
"unless" clause requiring diversification, i.e. unless "under the circumstances it is clearly prudent
not to do so").
21. The following cases have found prudent departures from the diversification rule: Etter v.
J. Pease Constr. Co., 963 F.2d 1005 (7th Cir. 1992) (profit sharing plan for 6 employees, with
assets of $127,993, invested 88% of its assets in one real estate venture); Reich v. King, 867 F.
Supp. 341, 344 (D. Md. 1994) (profit sharing plan of plumbing contractor, with assets of $5
million, invested 70% of assets in financially conservative residential real estate mortgages pri-
marily in one county); Lanka v. O'Higgins, 810 F. Supp. 379, 385 (N.D.N.Y. 1992) ("pension and
profit sharing plan" for office of two dentists with assets of $387,203 invested 98% of portfolio in
three stocks); Jones v. O'Higgins, 11 Employee Benefit Cases (BNA) 1660 (defined benefit and
target benefit plans for medical office employees, with assets of $836,335, invested 90% of fund
in three stocks); Metzler v. Graham, 112 F.3d 207, 208 (5th Cir. 1997) (defined-contribution plan
with 123 participants and $2,740,735 in assets invested 63% of assets in a single tract of land).
22. For statistical purposes, the Department of Labor categorizes plans with fewer than 100
participants as small plans. See EMPLOYEE BENEFITS SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, DEPT. OF LA-
BOR, PRIVATE PENSION PLAN BULLETIN: ABSTRACT OF 2001 FORM 5500 ANNUAL REPORTS
(2006). But for the purposes of applying the diversification rule, the size of the plan can best be
measured by total assets. The decisions cited infra note 21 excuse fiduciaries from diversification
in plans with $5 million or less in assets. With respect to the principles governing small plans, it
should be noted such plans have the option of investing in a larger diversified pool of invest-
ments through a mutual fund, bank collective trust or an insurance company pooled separate
account. The Department of Labor applies a look-through approach in analyzing the diversity of
such investments. See JAYNE E.' ZANGLEIN & SUSAN STABILE, ERISA LITIGATION 745 (2d ed.
2005). For discussions of the diversification dilemmas of small plans, see BINES & THEL, supra
note 16, at 406, 456; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS, § 227, cmt. h.
23. UNIF. PRUDENT INVESTORS ACT § 3 cmt., 7B U.L.A. 29-30 (2006).
24. UNIF. MGMT. PUB. EMPLOYEES RET. Sys. AT §8, 7A U.L.A. pt. 1II, 63 (2006).
510 DEPAUL BUSINESS & COMMERCIAL LAW JOURNAL
investing that is consistent with modern portfolio theory. The regula-
tion issued in 1979 directs the fiduciary to consider whether a "partic-
ular investment" is calculated "to further the purposes of the plan.
Taking into consideration the risk of loss and the opportunity for gain
.. . associated with the investment. '2 5 The history of this cautious
statement makes clear that it was intended to sanction reliance on
modern financial principles by authorizing the fiduciary to consider
aggregate risks and expected returns of a portfolio.26
The relative flexibility allowed by modern portfolio theory contrasts
with the practices of diversification prevailing in employer-directed
pension plans. In general, the concentration of institutional stock
ownership in individual companies has grown more slowly than the
institutional investors' share in the U.S. equity market,27 and the own-
ership stakes of pension funds have tended to be especially low. A
2004 survey of the top 25 institutional investors of the 25 largest cor-
porations revealed that only 2 or 3 pension funds typically rank among
the top 25 institutional investors and, with one exception, they placed
below the top 10 in the size of their stock holding. TIAA-CREF was
the only fund consistently included in the list of top investors.
CalPERS and other public pension funds - if they made the top 25
-ordinarily held no more than 0.5 percent of total stock of the
corporation. 28
The disinclination of investment managers to take advantage of the
flexibility allowed by modern portfolio theory may be due in part to
uncertainty as to interpretation of the law, but it undoubtedly also
owes something to the practice of index investing. In 2004, the 200
largest defined benefit plans devoted 23.5 percent of their portfolio to
indexed equities. 29 An index fund imposes practical constraints on the
fund manager's ability to engage in informed proxy voting. Since the
fund contains a cross-section of the entire market, the fiduciary's op-
tions are limited to a perfunctory response recurring issues or delega-
tion of proxy voting responsibility to an advisory service. The practice
of index investing is compatible with modern portfolio theory because
of the cost advantages it offers. As stated in the Third Restatement of
Trusts, passive investing through an index fund is a "practical invest-
25. 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404a-l(b)(2)(i) (2007).
26. See BINES & THEL, supra note 16, at 377-384.
27. Franklin R. Edwards & R. Glenn Hubbard, The Growth of Institutional Stock Ownership:
a Promise Unfulfilled, in CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AT THE CROSSROADS 347, 350 (Donald H.
Chew & Stuart L. Gillan eds., 2005).
28. THE CONFERENCE BOARD, supra note 3, at 38-50.
29. THE CONFERENCE BOARD, supra note 3, at 32.
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ment alternative," which "offers the pricing security and economies of
buying in essentially efficient markets. '30
Where diversification exceeds the dictates of modern portfolio the-
ory and lacks the cost justification of index investing, it can be in some
tension with the pension fiduciary's duty to engage in informed proxy
voting. The larger the portfolio the more difficult it will be to monitor
particular securities. The Department of Labor has repeatedly af-
firmed the fiduciary's duty to monitor proxy voting issues, without ad-
dressing the interface between this duty and the diversification rule.
The landmark Avon letter affirmed that "the fiduciary act of manag-
ing plan assets" included the voting of proxies to shares of corporate
stock.31 Six years later, the Department issued a more comprehensive
and nuanced statement in Interpretative Bulletin 94-2, which again
described the fiduciary's responsibilities as including the voting of
proxies for corporate stock. In a qualified approval of shareholder ac-
tivism, the Department stated that "activities intended to monitor or
influence the management of corporations" are consistent with a fidu-
ciary's duty under ERISA where the fiduciary has a "reasonable ex-
pectation" that "such monitoring ... is likely to enhance the value of
the plan's investment in the corporation, after taking into account the
costs involved. '32
In short, there are points of tension between the duty to monitor,
the diversification rule, and cost considerations involved in index in-
vesting and the process of monitoring itself. One may make a few safe
observations in this poorly explored area. First, the option of delegat-
ing proxy voting responsibility to an advisory service is not necessarily
an inferior one.33 Proxy voting services may allow fund managers to
delegate even the most complex proxy voting programs. The effi-
ciency and quality of the services may reflect the fund manager's de-
mand for effective corporate monitoring and willingness to incur
associated costs. Secondly, since the bulk of the benefit of diversifica-
tion is conferred by relatively few stocks, pension fund managers can
tailor a portfolio to their capacity to directly engage in meaningful
30. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS, § 227, cmt. h, at 28-29.
31. Avon Prods., Inc., DOL Op. Ltr., [1987-1989 Transfer Binder] Pens. Plan Guide (CCH)
23,747W at 25,163 (Feb. 23, 1988).
32. DOL Interpretative Bulletin 94-2 is codified as 29 C.F.R § 2509.94-2.
33. The largest proxy voting service is Institutional Investors Service, which has over 400 cli-
ents and considerable influence in the marketplace, at www.issproxy.com. It has a number of
active competitors, e.g., JMR Financial, at www.jmr-financial.com/pvs.htm; Voting Agency Ser-
vice (a recently formed co-venture of Investor Responsibility Research Center and Glass, Lewis
& Co); Proxy Governance, Inc., at www.proxygovernance.com; and EC Proxy Voting Services,
Inc., at www.ecproxyvoting.com.
2007]
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monitoring without sacrificing the benefits of diversification.34 As the
benefits of diversification approach zero, the value of monitoring rep-
resents a potential benefit that may be balanced against transaction
costs and other considerations. Thirdly, it is unrealistic to analyze
monitoring as an isolated activity of a single pension fund manager or
proxy voting service; it will normally involve elements of reciprocity
among similarly situated institutional investors. Monitoring can po-
tentially gain efficiency and effectiveness through concerted action by
pension funds that will spread the costs among individual funds and
lend the influence of a larger group to the individual exercise of share-
holder rights.35
Excessive diversification and perfunctory proxy voting may indeed
exist, but it is wrong to blame these phenomena on the diversification
rule. If the statute is construed in light of evolving standards of pru-
dent investing - as the legislative history appears to permit - the di-
versification rule can accommodate the opportunities and flexibility of
modern portfolio theory. Excessive diversification, where it is en-
countered, may stem more from a cultural predilection of fund man-
agers toward unnecessary caution.36 According to a former general
counsel of CalPERS, "pension plan trustees continue to welcome di-
versification and derive comfort from strategies that are widely ac-
cepted and relatively risk free. ' 37 The Department of Labor can
counter such unproductive caution by clearly affirming modern port-
folio theory and reconciling the duty (or option) of monitoring with
the practice of diversification. The 1979 regulation was an important
step in this direction, but there is still a need to more explicitly en-
dorse modern portfolio theory and to recognize the propriety of port-
folio management practices intended to achieve more effective
corporate monitoring, including moderate diversification and reliance
on professional proxy voting advisers.
B. Redundant Regulation
Institutional shareholders, it has been argued, are "hobbled by a
complex web of legal rules" that make it "expensive, and legally
34. Richard H. Koppes & Maureen L. Reilly, An Ounce of Prevention: Meeting the Fiduciary
Duty to Monitor and Index Fund Through Relational Investing, 20 J. CORP. L. 413, 445-447
(1995); BINES & THEL, supra note 16, at 456 n.398.
35. See discussion infra p. 22 and note 106.
36. See WILLIAM N. O'BARR & JOHN M. CONLEY, FORTUNE AND FOLLY: THE WEALTH AND
POWER OF INSTITUTIONAL INVESTING 194-201 (1992) (an anthropological study of pension
managers).




risky" for them to play an active role in corporate governance. 38 But
the normative question of whether specific measures of deregulation
should be undertaken involves a more specific question: are particular
institutional investors otherwise adequately regulated in the public in-
terest? The answer for pension funds, regulated under ERISA or
state law, may not apply for hedge funds, which are exempt from most
provisions of the Investment Company Act.39 The diversification
rules of ERISA and state law40 in fact present the unique phenome-
non of redundant regulation because they effectively prevent em-
ployer-sponsored plans, in both the private and public sphere, from
engaging in activities that a series of legal restrictions are also in-
tended to curb. I will examine four conspicuous areas of such redun-
dant regulation.
1. Section 13(d) of the Exchange Act
Section 13(d) is one of several amendments to the Exchange Act of
1934, known collectively as the Williams Act, enacted in 1968 in re-
sponse to concerns about the increasing use of cash tender offers in
hostile contests for corporate control.41 At that time, cash tender of-
fers fell outside the reach of federal securities law while proxy contests
were regulated by Section 14 of the Exchange Act of 1934 and ex-
change offers of securities were subject to the registration require-
ments of the Securities Act of 1933.42 As explained by Senator
Kuchel, a co-sponsor of the legislation, the new disclosure rules of
Section 13(d) were intended to prevent a "corporate raider" from act-
ing "under a cloak of secrecy while obtaining the shareholders needed
to put him on the road to a successful capture of the company." 43
As amended in 1970, Section 13(d) requires takeover bidders to file
with the SEC a prescribed statement, within 10 days of acquiring the
38. Black, supra note 7, at 523. Other seminal articles advancing this thesis include Conrad,
supra note 7; Mark J. Roe, A Political Theory of American Corporate Finance, 91 COLUM. L.
REV. 10 (1991). For a collection of articles bearing on this controversy, see generally, Thomas W.
Briggs, Shareholder Activism and Insurgency under New Proxy Rules, 50 Bus. LAW. 99, 100-101
(1994).
39. SHARTSis, FRIESE, LLP, U.S. REGULATION OF HEDGE FUNDS 87 (2005).
40. The retirement systems of 34 states use a variation of the prudent investor standard of
ERISA section 404(a)(1). Other states use a prudent person standard that requires a similar
practice of diversification. See CYNTHIA L. MOORE, PROTECTING RETIREES' MONEY 4-5 (Na-
tional Council on Teacher Retirement, 5th ed. 2005). For asset allocation practices, see CHARAC-
TERISTICS OF 100 LARGE PUBLIC PENSION PLANS 58-59 (National Education Association, 2002).
41. The legislative history is reviewed in Comment, Section 13(d) and Disclosure of Corporate
Equity Ownership, 119 U. PA. L. REV. 853 (1971).
42. See Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., 430 U.S 1, 22 (1976).
43. 113 CONG. REC. 857-858, quoted in Piper, 430 U.S. at 28.
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beneficial interest of 5 percent of any class of a corporation's equity
securities, which discloses the bidder's identity, the source of its funds,
the amount of its stock holdings, and any plans to change the business
or corporate structure.4 4 The purpose of the statute was "to alert the
market place to every large, rapid aggregation or accumulation of se-
curities, regardless of technique employed, which might represent a
potential shift in corporate control. ' '4 5 Filings are only moderately
burdensome but they invite litigation because a hostile management
can allege failure to make full disclosure.4 6 A failure to file or disclose
subjects an investor to a range of remedies, including disgorgement of
profits.4 7
To close a possible loophole in the disclosure requirements, Section
13(d)(3) provides that, when two or more persons act as a group "for
the purpose of acquiring, holding, or disposing of securities of an is-
suer," the group shall be deemed a "person" for the purpose of the
filing requirements of 13(d). 48 The Senate and House reports explain:
"This provision would prevent a group of persons who seek to pool
their voting or other interests in the securities of an issuer from evad-
ing the provisions of the statute because no one individual owns more
than ... [5] percent of a class of securities at the time they agreed to
act in concert. . .. ,,a9
On its face, this group action provision should not affect pension
funds because they virtually never act as a group in buying or selling
securities and have no reason to incur the sacrifice of liquidity that
such collective decision-making would entail,50 but the SEC has inter-
preted the provision to embrace coordinated voting of securities. The
regulations under Section 13(d) define a group as including persons
who "agree to act together for the purpose of acquiring, holding, vot-
ing or disposing of equity securities of an issuer. ' 51 Other regulatory
provisions serve to expand and fortify this concept of a voting group.
A beneficial interest in a security coming within the 5 percent rule is
very broadly defined to include inter alia the power to direct the vot-
ing of the security.52 The required disclosures include any intention to
44. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(1) (2007); 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-1 (2007).
45. GAF Corp. v. Milstein, 453 F.2d 709, 717 (2d Cir. 1971).
46. See Black, supra note 7, at 543.
47. See Briggs, supra note 38, at 120-121.
48. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(3) (2007).
49. Wellman v. Dickerson, 682 F.2d 355, 366 (2d Cir. 1982) (quoting S. REP. No 90-550, at 8
(1967); H.R. REP. No. 90-1711, at 8-9 (1968), reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2811, 2818).
50. See John C. Coffee, Jr., The SEC and the Institutional Investor: a Half-Time Report, 15
CARDOZO L. REV. 837, 877 (1994)
51. 17 C.F. R. § 240.13d-5(b)(1).
52. 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-3 (2007).
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seek a "change in the present board of directors or management of
the issuer."' 53 An effort to influence management of the corporation
by close monitoring skirts the broad definition of an intention to
change control of the corporation. 54 Adding to the over-breadth, the
courts have held that an agreement coming within the group provision
of Section 13(d) may be oral and informal and may be proved by cir-
cumstantial evidence. Whether the requisite agreement exists is a
question of fact. 55
The effect of this process of regulatory drift is to deter pension
funds from agreeing to vote together even on procedural matters, such
as confidential voting, which have nothing to do with contests for cor-
porate control.5 6 A fund manager, who receives communications on
proxy voting matters from another fund, will incur the risk of litiga-
tion by suggesting a joint course of action or by offering to co-sponsor
a shareholder resolution. Any arrangement to share costs of proxy
solicitation will be evidence of the existence of a voting group. 57
Pension funds subject to diversification requirements pose no threat
of secret combinations of power with predatory objectives to seize
corporate control.58 Indeed, as small concessions to reality, the SEC
regulations allow employee benefit plans to make simplified filings
and provide an exemption for private offerings. Unfortunately, the
simplified filings are still burdensome and still invite litigation.5 9
Moreover, to secure this largely meaningless concession, pension
funds must disclaim any interest in influencing policies of manage-
ment - in effect, the funds must promise shareholder passivity.60
Whether or not the legislative purpose of Section 13(d) supports the
53. 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-101 (2007), Instructions, Item 4(d).
54. 17 C.F.R. § 240.12b-2 (2007) provides: "The term 'control'... means the possession, direct
or indirect, of the power to direct or cause the direction of the management and policies of a
person, whether through the ownership of voting securities, by contract, or otherwise." This
definition is made applicable to Schedule 13D filings by 17 C.F.R. § 240-12b-1 (2007). See
Schedule D, Item 4(g) and (j). The relationship between these regulations is explained in Gen.
Aircraft Corp. v. Lampert, 556 F.2d 90, 96 (1st Cir. 1977).
55. See Hallwood Realty Partners v. Gotham Partners, 286 F.3d 613, 617 (2d Cir. 2002); SEC
v. Savoy Indus., 587 F.2d 1149, 1162-1163 (D.C. Cir. 1978); Schaffer v. C.C. Inv., LDC, 2002-2003
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH), $ 92248 (S.D.N.Y. 2002); Champion Parts Rebuilders, Inc. v. Cormier
Corp., 661 F. Supp. 825 (N.D. Il. 1978).
56. Coffee, supra note 50, at 879-880; Black, supra note 7, at 544.
57. Coffee, supra note 50, at 880.
58. See John C. Coffee, SEC Over-regulation of Proxy Contests, N.Y.L.J. 7 (Jan. 31, 1991).
59. 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.13d-l(b)(1)(ii) and (iii) and (2) (2007). Pension funds can file a short-
form statement on form 13G within 45 days after the end of a calendar year but still must notify
all beneficiaries of 13(d) filings filed in a year. Employee benefit plans also enjoy a limited
exemption in purchasing stock in a private offering. 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-5(b)(2) (2007).
60. The simplified filing requirements apply only on condition that the institutional investor
acquired securities without "the effect or changing or influencing the control of the issuer, nor in
2007]
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group-voting rule in other contexts, the rule should not apply to pen-
sion funds that are prevented by other regulations from engaging in
hostile contests for control. Public pension funds and private funds
subject to the diversification requirements of ERISA section
404(a)(1)(c) 61 should enjoy an unqualified exemption from the appli-
cation of 13(d) to group voting activities.62
2. Section 16(b) of the Exchange Act
Section 16(b) of the Exchange Act is intended to protect sharehold-
ers from short-swing speculation by corporate insiders with advance
information of matters affecting the market value of stock.63 It im-
poses a drastic no-fault remedy on the trading in stock by the benefi-
cial owner of more than 10 percent of the class of any equity security
or by a director or officer of the issuer. Any profit realized by such a
person from the sale and purchase of the security within any period of
less than six months "inures to" and is recoverable by the corporation,
thereby giving the corporation an incentive to bring suit.64 Sharehold-
ers may also sue under Section 16(b), and the courts have awarded
attorney's fees generously to encourage enforcement.65 The plaintiff
does not need to prove actual possession or misuse of insider informa-
tion or any fraudulent intent; rather, the statute applies mechanically
to impose liability within its narrowly drawn limits. 66
Pension funds with legally mandated diversification practices and a
relatively long-term investment horizon might seem to be far out of
range of Section 16(b), but the SEC regulations import into enforce-
ment of Section 16(b) the definition of beneficial ownership used
under Section 13(d). By defining beneficial ownership to embrace any
indirect arrangement to control voting, the regulations raise the
Spector of Section 16(b) sanctions for concerted voting among a group
connection with or as a participant in any transaction having such purpose or effect. 17
C.F.R. § 240.13d-l(b)(1)(i) (2007). See Coffee, supra note 50, at 877.
61. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(3) (2007); 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(C) (2007).
62. The exemption should be precisely limited to employee pension benefit plans that are
subject to the diversification requirements of section 404(a)(1)(C) of ERISA. See 29 U.S.C.
§ 1002(3) (2007) and 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(C) (2007). The SEC regulations loosely refer to
"employee benefit plans." This imprecise term includes plans that are either of little importance
or that would allow troubling use of employer stock.
63. 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (2007).
64. See generally WILLIAM K.S. WANG & MARC I. STEINBERG, INSIDER TRADING ch. 15
(1996).
65. Id. at 999 n.12.
66. See 5 Louis Loss & JOEL SELIGMAN, SECURITIES REGULATION 2343-2349 (3d ed. 2000).
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of funds.67 The regulations do provide an exemption for employee
benefit plans, but, as in the case of Section 13(d) regulations, it is
available only if a fund has no intention of influencing the control of
the corporation. 68 In view of the profit incentive to bring suit under
Section 16(d), an arrangement for concerted proxy voting among
pension funds would invite challenge not only under Section 13(d) but
also Section 16(b). 69
A separate litigation risk arises from a judicial gloss on the term
"director" enunciated by Feder v. Martin Marietta Corp.70 The presi-
dent and CEO of Martin Marietta Corporation, George Bunker,
served on the board of Sperry Rand Corporation after receiving the
approval of his own board of directors.71 During his tenure on the
board, Martin Marietta bought and sold stock in Sperry Rand within
the six-month period of Section 16(b). 72 A shareholder brought suit
against Martin Marietta itself to recover insider profits on the theory
that the corporation had deputized Bunker to serve on the Sperry
Rand board on its behalf.73 Citing dicta in earlier cases, 74 the court
upheld the deputization theory and found that the theory was proved
on the facts of the case.75
The Feder decision can be read narrowly as saying that Martin Mari-
etta came within the statutory definition of a director, i.e. "any direc-
tor of a corporation or any person performing similar functions with
respect to any organization. '76 Indeed, the Supreme Court has cited
the decision as holding only that a corporation may perform "the
functions" of a director.77 But the language in Feder suggests an alter-
67. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.16a-l(a) (2007) (incorporating by reference the definition of beneficial
owner under section 13(d)) and 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-3(a) (2007) ("a beneficial owner of a secur-
ity includes any person who, directly or indirectly, through any contract, arrangement, under-
standing ,relationship or otherwise has or shares: (1) Voting power which includes the power to
vote, or to direct the voting of, such security;...").
68. See 17 C.F.R. § 140.16a-l(a)(1) (2007) (shares must not be acquired with "the purpose or
effect of changing or influencing control of the issuer").
69. See Black, supra note 7, at 546; Coffee, supra note 58, at 7.
70. 406 F.2d 260 (2d Cir 1969).
71. Id. at 264-65.
72. Id. at 263.
73. Id. at 266.
74. Rattner v. Lehman, 193 F.2d 56, 567 (2d Cir. 1952) (concurring opinion Learned Hand, J.
"I wish to say nothing as to whether, if a firm deputed a partner to represent its interests as a
director of the board, the other partners would not be liable."); Blau v. Lehman, 368 U.S. 403,
408-410 (1960) (while refusing to reverse a lower court decision finding no deputization, the
court acknowledged that a partnership could still be a director and "function through a deputy"
for purposes of section 16(b)).
75. Feder, 406 F.2d at 266
76. 15 U.S.C. § 78c(7) (2007).
77. Reliance Elec. Co. v. Emerson Elec. Co., 404 U.S. 418, 424 n.4 (1971).
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native interpretation: a corporation, or other legal entity, will incur
liability for short-swing profits if it places an officer on the board of
the issuer for the purpose of conveying information about the issuer.
This theory of liability, premised on a "listening director," has been
criticized as lacking statutory support and importing the mechanical
rules of Section 16(b) into an area more appropriately governed by
Rule 10(b)-5.78 But the SEC has recognized the deputization theory
in principle while leaving it to a "case-by-case determination. ' 79 The
deputization theory continues to figure in litigation and has the poten-
tial of ensnaring a pension fund that is instrumental in placing a direc-
tor on the board of a corporation. 0
3. Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act
An odd twist to the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements
Act of 1976 adds another obstacle to the possibility of pension funds
having a representative on a corporate board. The Act, codified as
Section 7A of the Clayton Act,"' requires that the Federal Trade Com-
mission and the anti-trust division of the Department of Justice be
given a premerger notification 15 or 30 days in advance of the
purchase of the target company's stock. The purpose of the notice is
to give the antitrust enforcement agencies time to study the acquisi-
tion before it is consummated. The length of the waiting period de-
pends on the nature of the acquisition and may be extended if the
agencies request further information. A failure to give the notice or
comply with the waiting period subjects the acquiring corporation to
civil penalties and equitable relief.8 2
The Act has complex threshold provisions, but, in general, it applies
to stock purchases that cause the purchaser's holdings to exceed $50
million - a level that affects only the largest holdings of the largest
78. Carroll L. Wagner, Deputization and Section 16(b): The Implications of Feder v. Martin
Marietta Corporation, 78 YALE L.J. 1151 (1968-1969); 5 Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 66, at ch.
6E, 2402-2403; 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2007); Coffee, supra note 50, at 895-897.
79. See Exchange Act - Insiders, Exchange Act Release No. 26333 [1988-1989 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) T 84343, 89602 (Dec. 2, 1988). See also 5 Loss & SELIGMAN,
supra note 66, at 2402-2403.
80. Colan v. Cutler-Hammer, Inc., 812 F.2d 357, 364 n.9 (7th Cir. 1987); Dreiling v. Am. Ex.
Travel Related Serv., 351 F. Supp.2d 1077, 1083 (W.D. Wash. 2004); In re Enron Corp. Sec.,
Derivative and ERISA Lit., 258 F. Supp.2d 576, 645 (S.D. Tex. 2003); Lowey v. Howmet Corp.,
424 F.Supp. 461(S.D.N.D. 1977).
81. 15 U.S.C. § 18a(a) (2007).
82. See M. Howard Morse, Mergers and Acquisitions: Antitrust Limitations on Conduct Before
Closing, 57 Bus. LAW 1463, 1464-1475; William J. Baer, Reflections on Twenty Years of Merger
Enforcement under the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act, 65 ANTrrRUST L. J. 825 (1997); 5 Loss & SELIG-
MAN, supra note 66, at 2139-2140.
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pension funds.8 3 Institutional investors enjoy an exemption for
purchases made in the ordinary course of business and "solely for the
purpose of investment. '84 The difficulty lies in the regulatory defini-
tion of the latter phrase. The FTC's regulations provide that a pur-
chaser acquires a security "solely for purposes of investment" only if it
"has no intention of participating in the formulation, determination,
or direction of the basic business decisions of the issuer. '8 5 Thus, a
pension fund or other institution will forfeit the exemption if it later
seeks to place a representative on the board of directors. 86
The propriety of pension funds seeking representation on the board
of directors presents serious issues, but there is no statutory basis to
require a large fund pursuing this objective to comply with a proce-
dure intended to give the FTC and Department of Justice time to
study mergers and acquisitions. The exemption applying to purchases
"solely for the purpose of investment" clearly should be construed to
include all stock purchases by public pension funds and private pen-
sion funds subject to the diversification requirements of ERISA.
4. Proxy Rules
Section 14(a) of the Exchange Act authorizes the SEC to prescribe
rules, "in the public interest or for the protection of investors," for the
solicitation of "a proxy, consent, authorization or information state-
ment in respect of" a registered security. 87 Under this authority, the
SEC has issued rules that require any proxy solicitation of a share-
holder to be accompanied by a proxy statement, filed with the SEC at
least ten days previously, which meets certain detailed requirements.88
The proxy solicitation process is notoriously costly, 89 and the defini-
tion of a solicitation that was adopted in 195690 is so broad as to turn
83. See MICHAEL USEEM, INVESTOR CAPITALISM: How MONEY MANAGERS ARE CHANGING
THE FACE OF CORPORATE AMERICA 31 (1996).
84. 15 U.S.C. § 18a(c)(9) (2007); 16 C.F.R. § 802.64(b)(3) (2007).
85. 16 C.F.R. § 801.1(i)(1) (2007).
86. See STEPHEN M. AXINN ET AL., ACQUISITIONS UNDER THE HART-SCOTF-RODINO ANTI-
TRUST IMPROVEMENTS ACT § 6.15(3), at 6-108 (2005).
87. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (2007). Section 14(a) (codified as 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a)) provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person... in contravention of such rules and regulations as
the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for
the protection of investors, to solicit or to permit the use of his name to solicit any
proxy or consent or authorization in respect of any security ... registered pursuant to
781 of this title.
88. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (2007); 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.14a-3(a), 14a-6 (2007); 5 Loss & SELIGMAN,
supra note 66, at 1955-1979.
89. 5 Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 66, at ch. 6.C., 1912-1927 (2006 Supp. 763).
90. A solicitation embraces any "communication to security holders under circumstances rea-
sonably calculated to result in the procurement, withholding, or revocation of a proxy." 17
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almost any discussion of management performance with other share-
holders, management or third-party sources of information into a reg-
ulated proxy solicitation. 91
The SEC has not changed the 1956 definition of a solicitation, but,
in response to complaints that the rules restrict useful exchanges of
information, 92 it adopted in 1992 a complex set of reforms that some-
what mitigate its impact. 93 The revised regulations retain a previous
exemption applying "where the total number of persons solicited is
not more than ten."' 94 They also ease certain administrative burdens
and filing deadlines and modify the definition of solicitation to ex-
clude public announcements by investors of how they intend to vote.95
Most important, the revised Rule 14a-2(b) provides a qualified ex-
emption for solicitations by a person who does not seek "either on its
own or another's behalf, the power to act as a proxy for a security
holder. '96 In other words, shareholders can communicate freely with
each other, without first filing a proxy statement, if they do not seek
proxy authority. However, if a shareholder claiming this exemption
has $5 million worth of stock, the shareholder is still required to file
promptly after the exempt shareholder communication all written
materials transmitted to other shareholders, along with a notice of ex-
empt solicitation. 97 A shareholder's election to employ this exemp-
tion is irrevocable; if the shareholder invokes the exemption and later
C.F.R. § 240.14a-1(1)(1) (2007). The language of the definition draws from language of Learned
Hand in SEC v. Okin, 132 F.2d 784, 789 (2d Cir. 1943), who posed the question whether the
SEC's power "extends to any other writings which are part of a continuous plan ending in solici-
tation and which prepare the way for its success."
91. See Final Rules, Exchange Act Release 31326 [1992 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep
(CCH) T 85051, at 83,356 ("...literal breadth [of definition of solicitation] potentially turned
almost every expression of opinion.., into a regulated proxy solicitation") and 83,357 (commen-
tators stated that the scope of definition under the proxy rules has a "chilling effect on attempts
to participate in corporate governance process by expressing their views.") (Oct. 16, 1992).
92. See Proposed Rules, Exchange Act Release 29315 [1991 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) 1 84811, at 81844 (June 17, 1991) (CaIPERS and others "manifest a strong concern
that the Commission's proxy filing and disclosure requirements function to restrict unduly secur-
ity-holder communications not only with one another, but also with the issuer's management and
board of directors as well as third-party sources of proxy voting information unaffiliated with
any person participating in a particular solicitation.")
93. See Final Rules, supra note 91. For a summary and history of the 1992 reforms, see Norma
M. Sharara & Anne E. Hoke-Witherspoon, The Evolution of the 1992 Shareholder Communica-
tion Proxy Rules and Their Impact on Corporate Governance, 49 Bus. LAW 327 (1993).
94. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-2(b)(2) (2007).
95. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-1(l)(2)(iv) (2007).
96. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-2(b)(1) (2007).
97. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-6(g) (2007).
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decides to seek a proxy, the exemption becomes retroactively unavail-
able and earlier communications are in violation of the proxy rules.98
The 1992 reforms were cautious measures that appear to have
brought no fundamental change in corporate governance relation-
ships.99 The SEC's caution may well have been appropriate in deregu-
lating the activities of aggressive speculators, such as hedge and risk
arbitrage funds, 100 but the revised rules lack any apparent justification
as applied to pension funds subject to the diversification requirements
of ERISA and state law. Concerted action is the only way these funds
can achieve a voice in corporate governance commensurate to their
share ownership. With small stakes in individual companies and a
long-term investment outlook, they are effectively precluded from en-
gaging in manipulative schemes and have no record of doing so.10 1
But the rules still encumber these funds by limiting concerted action
to certain defined paths: communications following an irrevocable de-
cision not to seek proxies, contacts with no more than ten sharehold-
ers, and association activities removed from the exercise of proxy
voting.10 2 The rules call for circumspection, reduce options for coop-
erative action, and may trigger onerous filing requirements.
In the case of diversified pension funds, the pertinent question is
not whether the restrictions of the proxy rules are excessive, but
rather why they exist at all. What is the justification under the statu-
tory standard, "in the public interest or for the protection of inves-
tors?" The rules currently contain exemptions (or qualified
exemptions) for harmless communications, i.e., fewer than ten con-
tacts and communications that do not seek proxy voting authority.10 3
If one accepts the premise that the pooling of knowledge and re-
sources among diversified funds is a highly desirable phenomenon, an
exemption tailored for diversified pension funds also belongs in the
proxy rules.
98. Bernard S. Black, Next Steps in Proxy Reform, 18 J. CORP. L. 1, 12 (1993).
99. See Stephen Choi, Proxy Issue Proposals: Impact of the 1992 SEC Proxy Reforms, 16 J. L.
ECON. & ORG. 233 (2000).
100. See Briggs, supra note 38, at 101-102, 147-148.
101. The same logic would apply to endowment funds and church plans. It is worth noting
that [endowment funds] and church plans are treated in parity with pension plans in 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.13d-1(b)(1)(ii) (2007). Endowment funds accounted for 1.9 percent of total U.S. equity
market in 2003. THE CONFERENCE BOARD, supra note 3, at 29.
102. Most notably the Council of Institutional Investors. See http://www.cii.org.
103. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-2(b)(2) (2007) (fewer than ten shareholder contacts) and 17
C.F.R. § 240.14a-6(g) (2007) (shareholders with less than $5 million in stock).
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5. Deregulation and its Consequences
The long accumulation of laws relating to securities and corporate
control at both federal and state levels gives rise to other litigation
hazards for pension funds seeking closer involvement in corporate
governance,04 but these additional regulatory restrictions are either
relatively remote or do not fall easily into the category of redundant
regulation. The four restrictions we have examined are significant and
share a common element of regulatory perversity: they lack any rea-
sonable justification in legislative purpose or public policy as applied
to diversified pension funds. They should all be eliminated.
Nevertheless, it is important to bear in mind the limited effects of
this program of deregulation. In the case private employer-directed
pension plans, the effect is likely to be small. Some jointly trusteed
union funds have already achieved a degree of coordination by adher-
ence to the proxy voting policies of the AFL-CIO.10 5 Outside the
union sphere, the passivity of employer-directed plans has deep roots
in conflicts of interest that we will examine in the next section. The
principal effect would be to enable public pension funds to more ef-
fectively pool resources in corporate governance activities, but public
pension funds have shown a somewhat modest proclivity to engage in
the opportunities for concerted action that are now allowed of
them. 106 Deregulation can be expected only to open opportunities for
further institutional innovations and reforms that might lead to more
active corporate monitoring.
C. Conflicts of Interest
By legislative inadvertence, ERISA produced an administrative sys-
tem for private employer-directed pension plans that is characterized
by pervasive conflict of interest checked by fiduciary duties. This par-
adoxical system resulted from Congress' intent "to spread a broad
104. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Redirecting State Takeover Laws at Proxy Contests, 1992 Wis.
L. REV. 1071, 1096-1102.
105. See discussion infra Part II.C. and note 191.
106. Coffee maintains that public pension fund managers are politically motivated to seek
individual credit rather than collective solutions. See John C. Coffee, Jr., The Folklore of Inves-
tor Capitalism, 95 MICH. L. REV. 1970, 1977-79 (1997)). But there is some evidence to the con-
trary. See Ronald B. Davis, The Enron Pension Jigsaw: Assembling Accountable Corporate
Governance by Fiduciaries, 36 U. BRIT. COLUM. L. REV. 541, 573 (2003) (sharing of information
among Canadian pension funds); JAMES P. HAWLEY & ANDREW T. WILLIAMS, THE RISE OF
FIDUCIARY CAPITALISM 173 (2000) (statement of Colorado pension fund executive); Joann S.
Lublin & Sara Calian, Activist Pension Funds in Trans-Atlantic Alliance, WALL ST. J., Nov. 23,
1998, at A4 (cooperation between CaIPERS and Hermes Pension Management Ltd., Britain's
largest pension fund manager) and the participation of sixty-nine public pension funds in the
Council of Institutional Investors. See www.ici.org, supra note 102.
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protective net of fiduciary responsibility" over the administration of
pension plans,10 7 while leaving the actual administrative structure un-
regulated and under management control. We will examine first the
fiduciary structure and then explore the problem of conflicts of inter-
est that pertain to proxy voting.
ERISA establishes both a formal fiduciary structure and a func-
tional test of fiduciary duties.'0 8 The formal structure begins with a
"named fiduciary" designated in the written plan document - a con-
cept unprecedented in trust law. 10 9 The statute leaves the choice of
the named fiduciary up to the employer without imposing qualifica-
tions or other requirements of any kind. The named fiduciary may be
a committee of corporate officers, which meets on an ad hoc basis to
deal with pension matters, 110 a committee of directors,"'1 or even the
corporation itself.11 2 Second, ERISA requires that all assets of the
pension plan other than insurance contracts and certain plans must be
held in trust. 1 3 The named fiduciary is not a trustee but may have
authority to appoint and direct the actions of a trustee if the plan so
provides. The trustee is ordinarily a bank or insurance company, al-
though the statute again imposes no requirements as such, and the
plan sponsor may choose a corporate officer to serve as an in-house
trustee.114 Finally, the named fiduciary is authorized to appoint an
investment manager to manage the assets of the plan. In this case, the
107. Dist. 65, UAW v. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc., 670 F. Supp. 550, 555 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
108. See Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 262 (1993) (ERISA defines fiduciary "in
functional terms of control and authority over the plan"); In re Enron Corp. Sec., Derivative &
ERISA Litig., 284 F. Supp. 2d 511, 543 (S.D. Tex. 2003) (states the two tests of fiduciary respon-
sibility under ERISA).
109. 29 U.S.C.§ 1102(a) (2007); Patricia Wick Hatamyar, See No Evil? The Role of the Di-
rected Trustee under ERISA, 64 TENN. L. REV. 1, 29 (1996).
110. See, e.g., Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. Ross, 733 F. Supp. 1005, 1006 (M.D.N.C. 1990).
111. See ROBERT A.G. MONKS & NELL MINOW, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 157-58 (3d ed.
2004). Monks asserts that that "trustees of private pension funds spend little time fulfilling their
duties" because the duties are "considered ancillary to their main corporate responsibilities."
ROBERT A.G. MONKS, THE EMPEROR'S NIGHTINGALE: RESTORING THE INTEGRITY OF THE
CORPORATION IN THE AGE OF SHAREHOLDER ACTIvISM 147 (1998). According to another
source, the average chief financial officer in the United States spends about three percent of her
time managing her company's retirement accounts. Nikolay A. Ouzounov, Keeping Employees'
Trust: The Rocky Road Ahead for Pension Plan Trustees, 37 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 903, 903
(2004).
112. See 29 C.F.R. § 2509.75-5, at FR-3 (2007).
113. 29 U.S.C. § 1103(a), (b) (2007).
114. See Hatamyar, supra note 109, at 8 n.46; see also Gregory S. Alexander, Pensions and
Passivity, 56 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 111, 125 (1993) ("Some firms exacerbate pension owner-
ship passivity by keeping all of these fiduciary positions at home, appointing in-house trustees,
named fiduciaries, and investment managers."). The case law abounds in examples of banks
acting as trustees. See, e.g., In re Am. Continental/Lincoln Sav. & Loan Sec. Litig., 794 F. Supp.
1424, 1458 (D. Ariz. 1992).
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statute imposes the statutory requirement that the investment man-
ager must be a registered investment adviser, bank, or insurance
company."i 5
Overlying this formal scheme is a functional definition of a fiduciary
as a person who has "any discretionary authority or discretionary re-
sponsibility" in the administration of the plan.116 As a leading text
observes, the definition is broad "enough to include nearly everyone
having a measurable influence in fashioning or carrying out an invest-
ment program for a covered employee benefit plan.' 1 7 Thus, a cor-
porate officer's power to appoint or remove a trustee or investment
manager has been held to imply a duty to monitor the actions of the
trustee or manager." 8 Further expanding the reach of the functional
test, ERISA casts a net of co-fiduciary liability on corporate officers
with pension plan responsibilities who fail to prevent or to remedy a
breach of duty by other fiduciaries."l 9
The broad and ill-defined group of corporate officers charged with
fiduciary duties toward the pension plan is inevitably placed in a posi-
tion of dual loyalty to the pension beneficiaries and the corporate em-
ployer. ERISA does not preclude such a position of dual loyalties,1 20
but in fact expressly provides that a person may serve as a fiduciary
"in addition to being an officer, employee, agent, or other representa-
tive" of the plan sponsor. 21 A Second Circuit decision cautioned that
a company officer should resign as pension trustee during a hostile
takeover attempt, 22 but pension fiduciaries are still routinely charged
115. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(38) (2007).
116. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21) (2007).
117. BINES & THEL, supra note 16, at 61. The volume of litigation over fiduciary status of
particular defendants attests to the practical importance of the functional test of fiduciary re-
sponsibility. See Susan P. Serota, Overview of ERISA Fiduciary Law, in ERISA FIDUCIARY LAW
10-11 (Susan Scrota ed., 1995).
118. Henry v. Champlain Enters., 288 F. Supp. 2d 202, 232 (N.D.N.Y. 2003); Keach v. U.S.
Trust Co., 234 F. Supp. 2d 872 (C.D. Ill. 2003).
119. 29 U.S.C. § 1105(a) (2007).
120. See Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211, 225 (2000) ("Under ERISA ... a fiduciary may
have financial interests adverse to beneficiaries."); Scardelletti v. Bobo, 897 F. Supp. 913, 918 (D.
Md. 1995); Dist. 65, UAW v. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc., 670 F. Supp. at 557 ("Although
'dual loyalty' and a potentiality of conflict of interest exist when an employer also acts as an
administrator or trustee of a pension plan, ERISA does not preclude an employer from serving
as a plan administrator."); Musto v. Am. Gen. Corp., 615 F. Supp. 1483, 1501 (M.D. Tenn. 1985)
("Unlike the common law prohibition against dual loyalties, Congress permits the fiduciary of
benefit plans to assume multiple obligations."); Mark A. Vogel, Named Fiduciaries, in ERISA
FIDUCIARY LAW, supra note 117, at 214-15.
121. 29 U.S.C. § 1108(c)(3) (2007).
122. Donovan v. Bierwirth, 680 F.2d 263, 271-272 (2d Cir. 1982); see also Danaher Corp. v.
Chicago Pneumatic Tool Co., 635 F. Supp. 246, 250 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
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with deciding matters relating to pension benefits that will affect cor-
porate cash flow, tax liability, and investment opportunities. 123
ERISA addresses the problem of dual loyalties of pension adminis-
trators by imposing on them a fiduciary duty to act in the interests of
participants and beneficiaries.' 24 As formulated by Section 404, "a fi-
duciary shall discharge his duties with respect to a plan solely in the
interest of the participants and beneficiaries and - (A) for the exclu-
sive purpose of: (i) providing benefits to participants and their benefi-
ciaries; and (ii) defraying reasonable expenses of administering the
plan.' 25 Complementing this provision, Section 406 describes a series
of prohibited transactions involving dealings between a plan and re-
lated employers, unions, service providers, and fiduciaries.' 26
The unintended consequence of the structure of fiduciary responsi-
bility is to place the voting of proxies in pension funds under the con-
trol of management, which has an almost unfailing propensity to
123. On the use of pension plans for purposes of corporate finance, see TERESA GHI-
LARDUCCI, LABOR'S CAPITAL: THE ECONOMICS AND POLITICS OF PRIVATE PENSIONS, 85-110
(1992); Teresa Ghilarducci, Small Benefits, Big Pension Funds, and How Governance Reforms
Can Close the Gap, in WORKING CAPITAL, THE POWER OF LABOR'S PENSIONS 158 (Archon
Fung, et al eds., 2001). The courts have allowed corporate fiduciaries to engage in investments
that incidentally benefit the corporation or the fiduciaries themselves if the investments serve
the beneficiaries interest. Donovan v. Bierwirth, 680 F.2d. at 271; but see Leigh v. Engle, 727
F.2d 113 (7th Cir. 1984) (investment in pension fund for corporate benefit, though profitable,
violated fiduciary duty). Most decisions in this field, however, are decided by applying a distinc-
tion between actions in administering the plan, which are subject to a fiduciary duty, and actions
lying within the corporation's capacity as settlor of the pension trust to which no fiduciary re-
sponsibility attaches. See Dewitt v. Penn-Del Directory Corp., 106 F.3d 514, 520 (3d Cir. 1997);
Nazay v. Miller, 949 F.2d 1323, 1329 (3d Cir. 1991); Stout v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 957 F. Supp.
673, 693 (E.D. Pa. 1997); United Rubber, Cork, Linoleum & Plastic Workers v. Perelli Arm-
strong Tire Corp., 873 F. Supp. 1093, 1101 (M.D. Tenn. 1994); Amato v. W. Union Int'l, Inc., 773
F.2d 1402, 1416-17 (2d Cir. 1985). Corporate actions as settlor include plan amendments (see
Hughes Aircraft Co. v. Jacobson, 525 U.S. 432, 438, 443-46 (1999); Lockheed Corp. v. Spink, 517
U.S. 882, 889-91 (1996); Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. Schoonejongen, 514 U.S. 73, 78 (1994)), changes
in the level of funding (see Johnson v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 19 F.3d 1184, 1188 (7th Cir. 1994);
Siskind v. Sperry Ret. Program, Unisys, 47 F.3d 498, 505 (2d Cir. 1995) ("an employer must have
latitude in the sound management of its business to determine the benefits it will guarantee"))
and plan terminations (see Payank v. HMW Indus., 883 F.2d 221, 224-25 (3d Cir. 1989).
124. Schaefer v. Ark. Med. Soc'y, 853 F.2d 1487, 1492 (8th Cir. 1988) ("When a fiduciary has
dual loyalties . . . the prudent person standard requires that he make a careful and impartial
investigation of all investment decisions"); Donovan v. Bierwirth, 538 F. Supp. 463, 468
(E.D.N.Y. 1981), affd as modified, 680 F.2d 263 ("Having provided for an unorthodox departure
from the common law rule against dual loyalties, Congress provided two statutory safeguards to
protect plan participants and beneficiaries," i.e., 29 U.S.C. §§ 1104(a), 1106 (2007)).
125. 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(A) (2007).
126. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1002(14), 1106 (2007).
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support management recommendations in other corporations. 127
Useem explains:
[C]orporate executives quickly close ranks when it comes to na-
tional policies or shareholder power. This is due to both higher
principles and pragmatic politics. Top managements still share the
traditional belief that they, not shareholders, should run their com-
panies. They know, in any case, that allowing their pension funds to
vote against the managements of other firms is to invite retaliation
the next time their own enterprise is under shareholder challenge.
Companies constantly compete with other companies for customers,
but they seem constitutionally incapable of challenging one another
on governance. 128
The system-wide effect is to subtract the equity securities in employer-
directed pension funds - approximately six percent of the total U.S.
equity market - from any meaningful role in monitoring corporate
management. 29
Corporate dominance of proxy voting is not affected by the ap-
pointment of an outside investment manager. Many corporations
keep the task of proxy voting in-house, while delegating other invest-
ment functions to an outside manager; and nearly all corporations give
their investment managers proxy voting instructions and attempt
some monitoring. 130 Even if the monitoring is lax, the professional
managers have a compelling incentive to conform to their clients'
preferences so as to secure and expand their business relationships.
127. For observations on management dominance of proxy voting by pension plans, see Black,
supra note 7, at 596-98 (1990); MONKS & MINOW, supra note 111, at 157; MONKS & MINOW,
supra note 111, at 147, 153; Mark J. Roe, The Modern Corporation and Private Pensions, 41
UCLA L. REV. 75, 77 (1993) ("Few managers want their pension more active in the corporate
governance of other companies than they would want their stockholders to be active in their
firm."). There are two systematic studies on point: O'BARR & CONLEY, supra note 36, at 194-
201 (O'Barr and Conley use the methods of anthropology in studying the community of invest-
ment managers) and John Pound, Proxy Contests and Efficiency of Shareholder Oversight, 20 J.
OF FIN. ECON. 237, 242-44, 260 (1988) (a statistical study supports hypothesis of conflict of inter-
est in proxy voting).
128. USEEM, supra note 83.
129. This figure excludes 401(k) plans and other employee-directed plans, which are discussed
infra Part II.F. The Conference Board data indicates that 12.7 percent of equity holdings are in
private trusteed plans. Employer-directed plans ordinarily consist of defined benefit plans,
which account for 46 percent of the assets of this category. THE CONFERENCE BOARD, supra
note 3, at 29, 31.
130. Monks and Minow report, "A recent trend, endorsed by the Business Roundtable, is for
plan sponsors to leave other aspects of the fund management outside, but to take the proxy
voting in house." MONKS & MINOW, supra note 111, at 157. See PATRICK J. DAVEY, VOTING
PENSION FUND PROXIES, 6, 12-18 (The Conference Board, 1991) (surveys conducted by the Con-
ference Board revealed that in-house voting increased from 8 percent to 28 percent from 1988 to
1994 in the wake of the Avon letter). See infra note 31.
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The Department of Labor actually imposes on corporate officers
serving as pension fiduciaries a duty to monitor the proxy voting of
investment managers where voting authority is delegated.' 3 ' Interpre-
tative bulletin 94-2 begins with the premise that where a named fiduci-
ary delegates the power to manage pension assets to an investment
manager, the delegation may include responsibility to vote proxies on
corporate stock in the pension fund.' 32 The fiduciary may then re-
quire the investment manager to comply with a statement of policy
that sets forth "guidelines on the voting of proxies on shares of stock
for which the investment manager is responsible." 133 The fiduciary's
responsibility to monitor the performance of the investment manager
includes an obligation to "periodically monitor the activities of the
investment manager with respect to ... actions taken by the invest-
ment manager with regard to proxy voting decisions.1 34
For its part, the SEC requires that the investment managers be ame-
nable to instructions by their corporate principals on proxy voting.1 35
The SEC regulation on proxy voting by investment advisers, issued
under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, states three principles
that in most applications are beyond criticism:136 1) Registered invest-
ment advisers must adopt written policies and procedures intended to
assure that client interests are served in proxy voting, including proce-
dures to deal with conflicts of interests between a client and other
clients, 2) they must disclose to clients how they may obtain informa-
tion about how their proxies are voted, and 3) they must convey to
clients their proxy voting policies and procedures. The regulation,
however, does not address the conflict of interest between corporate
management and pension fund beneficiaries in proxy voting. In fact,
the regulation actually aggravates these conflicts of interest by expos-
ing investment managers to corporate pressure during proxy contests.
In principle, a client should have ready access to information about
proxy voting, but as applied to fiduciaries with dual loyalties, this oth-
erwise sound principle serves to re-enforce patterns of management
domination of proxy voting.
131. Dept. of Labor, Interpretative Bulletin 94-2, codified at 29 C.F.R. § 2509.94-2 (2007). See
also Avon letter, supra note 31.
132. 29 C.F.R. § 2509.94-2, 343 (2007).
133. Id. at 344.
134. 29 C.F.R. § 2509.94-2 (2007). The ruling is cited favorably in Cal. Ironworkers Field Pen-
sion v. Loomis-Sayles, 259 F.3d 1036, 1042 (9th Cir. 2001).
135. Investment Adviser's Act Release 2106 (Jan. 31, 2003), codified in 17 C.F.R. 275.206(4)-6
(2007).
136. See THOMAS P. LEMKE & GERALD T. LINS, REGULATION OF INVESTMENT ADVISERS 254-
59 (2006); CLIFFORD E. KIRSCH, INVESTMENT ADVISER REGULATION: A STEP-BY-STEP GUIDE
TO COMPLIANCE AND THE LAW 11-2 to 11-10 (1996).
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The passivity of corporate pension funds in proxy voting represents
only a small subset of the problems raised by the system of dual loyal-
ties of pension administrators under ERISA. Beneficiaries are in fact
very unlikely to be concerned with proxy voting, which has only a sys-
tem-wide importance. Of immediate importance to them will be deci-
sions affecting the actual provision of benefits. A revealing series of
cases concerned the termination of defined benefit plans in the 1980s.
The termination rules required that the pension plan purchase annui-
ties from insurers to fund vested benefits but provided that any assets
remaining after purchase of the annuities would revert back to the
corporation. 137 A low premium for annuities, of course, increased the
reversion of assets to the corporation. One executive who chose a low
bid of a failing insurance company over the bid of other financially
sound insurers was later called to testify before a Congressional com-
mittee. After recounting his testimony, Stein concludes,
The lesson we should draw from this story, which was replayed in
several hundred major plan terminations.., is that some fiduciaries,
including some who are stewarding the affairs of plans of major cor-
porations, will discharge their obligations to achieve benefits for
themselves unless they believe their actions will be closely
scrutinized.1 38
The consequences of conflicts of interest in proxy voting by em-
ployer-sponsored pension plans could be curbed somewhat by
changes in the existing regulatory scheme. Corporate management
could be barred from keeping proxy voting in-house while delegating
other investment functions to an investment manager - an arrange-
ment calculated to assure management domination of proxy voting139
- and the practice of maintaining in-house trustees could be prohib-
ited by requiring the appointment of unrelated firms to provide this
service. Investment managers could be shielded from day-to-day
pressure from management in proxy voting by precluding considera-
tion of client requests for information until sixty days after close of
voting.1 40 Finally, with the widespread use of electronic proxy voting
software, it would be entirely feasible to require investment advisers
137. See Bussian v. RJR Nabisco, 223 F.3d 286, 295 (5th Cir. 2000).
138. Norman Stein, ERISA & the Limits of Equity, 56 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 71, 105-07
(1993).
139. See Black, supra note 7, at 598 ("The third alternative - delegating investment power and
retaining voting power - is potentially the most conflict-ridden."); Coffee, supra note 9, at 1357
(1991) ("The decision of a pension fund to delegate investment discretion, while retaining or
reclaiming voting discretion, is inherently questionable").
140. The SEC disclosure rules for mutual funds now require disclosure of proxy voting no




to post their proxy voting record on their website, thereby subjecting
them to some countervailing pressures from beneficiaries and pro-
spective customers. 41
These minor reforms might temper but would not eliminate con-
flicts of interest in proxy voting by employer-sponsored plans. 42 The
business interests of trustees and investment managers would still give
them an incentive to anticipate the desires of management in proxy
voting. Moreover, to the extent that these proposals might enhance
the autonomy of investment managers, they are subject to a serious
objection: they would tend to shift the locus of proxy voting responsi-
bility from corporate management to other business entities equally
lacking in accountability and subject to other kinds of conflicts of
interest.143
There can be only one adequate solution to the problem of dual
loyalties in employer-directed pension plans: it is to establish an ad-
ministrative structure with guarantees of independence. The United
Kingdom chose this course in the Pension Act 1995, a comprehensive
reform of private pensions that was extensively amended nine years
later in the Pension Act 2004. These pension acts can be regarded as
the British counterparts to ERISA adopted more than twenty years
later.1 44 They require private pension plans to be administered by a
board of trustees, with statutorily defined responsibilities,145 which
must retain an independent auditor and actuary unrelated to the spon-
soring company. An agency called the Pensions Regulator processes
complaints from the auditor and actuary, as well as from individual
trustees and beneficiaries, and is authorized to conduct investigations,
remove trustees for "serious or persistent" breach of duty, and ap-
141. Personal communication of John Harrington, principal of Harrington Investments, Inc.,
an investment adviser, on October 17, 2006. A recent study of the GAO calls broadly for greater
transparency of plan fiduciaries and appears to be directed at investment advisers. See U.S.
GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, PENSION PLANS: ADDITIONAL TRANSPARENCY AND
OTHER ACrIONS NEEDED IN CONNECTION WITH PROXY VOTING 28-30 (Aug. 2004).
142. The reforms would require legislation. Dept. of Labor, Interpretative Bulletin 94-2 is a
reasonable application of the fiduciary duties created by ERISA sections 402 and 403 (29 U.S.C.
§§1102, 1103 (2007)), and Investment Advisor Release 2106 properly applies section 206 of the
Investment Advisers Act. See SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 194-95
(1963).
143. See Roy C. SMITH & INGO WALTER, GOVERNING THE MODERN CORPORATION, CAPI-
TAL MARKETS, CORPORATE CONTROL, AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 125, fig. 6.1 (2006)
("Who Owns Asset Managers?").
144. The Pension Act 1995 is reprinted in 33 Halsbury's Statutes (4th ed.) at 851 et seq. The
Pension Act 2004 may be found on the website of the Office of Public Sector Information. See
http://www.opsi.gov.uk/ACTS/acts2004/20040035.htm. See generally, George Walker, United
Kingdom Pensions Law Reform, 64 BROOK. L. REV. 871 (1998).
145. Pension Act 1995 §§ 18A-36.
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point replacement trustees.146 The agency requires pension boards to
adopt procedures to assure the appointment of qualified members and
to provide for their continuing education; among other services, it of-
fers training programs for trustees, including online courses of
instruction. 147
One third of the trustees on the pension board (or at least 2 mem-
bers) must be nominated by members of the pension plan.148 Each
pension board is charged with putting in place procedures for select-
ing the member-nominated trustees, which may be tailored to the
needs of a particular company. In July 2006, the Pension Regulator
issued a draft Code of Practice offering guidance on appropriate
methods of choosing member-nominated trustees. Adopting a princi-
ple-based approach, the Code requires nominating and selection pro-
cedures affording proportionality, fairness and transparency; and it
outlines alternative methods of selection that may meet these criteria.
The member-nominated trustees may be trade union representatives,
but only if the employer agrees. The board of trustees must review its
selection procedures every three to five years, and, as in other pension
matters, members may report improprieties to the Pension
Regulator. 149
The importance of an independent board of pension trustees ex-
tends beyond proxy voting; it would directly serve the interests of ben-
eficiaries by remedying conflicts of interest in the administration of
pension benefits. Management also would have something to gain in
a reform modeled after the British legislation. By confining fiduciary
liability to a board of trustees with clearly identified duties, manage-
ment would be freed of the threat of litigation presented by the vague
functional theories of fiduciary responsibility under ERISA. In addi-
tion, management would gain a strong argument for reducing the ad-
146. Pension Act 1995 § 3.
147. See The Pension Regulator, Code of Practice 7, Trustee Knowledge and Understanding,
available at www.pensionsregulator.gov.uk/pdf/CodeTKuFinal.pdf
148. Pension Act 1995 § 16; Pension Act 2004, § 241; Occupational Pension Schemes (Mem-
ber-nominated Trustees and Directors) Regulations 2006, available at Office of Public Sector
Information website, http://www.opsi.gov.uk/si/si2006/20060714.htm. Australia also has a regu-
lated system of pension boards with employee representation. See Greg Burner, Private Pen-
sions Supervisory Methods in Australia, in SUPERVISING PRIVATE PENSIONS, OECD Private
Pensions Series, No. 6 (2004). Canadian provinces, with the exception of Quebec, allow employ-
ers to administer pension funds despite the kind of conflicts of interest that occur under ERISA.
See Eileen E. Gillese, Pension Plans and the Law of Trusts, 75 CANADIAN BAR REV. 221, 229
(1996).
149. Pensions Regulator, Draft Code of Practice No. 8 Member-nominated trustees and direc-
tors - putting in place and implementing arrangements. See http://www.thepensionsregulator.
gov.uk/codesOfPractice/mnt.index.aspx
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ministrative burdens now weighing on pension plans, including some
of the onerous reporting requirements. By introducing a framework
of self-regulation, the British model would offer assurances of integ-
rity in pension plan administration that would justify easing external
controls.
D. Union Plans
A distrust of unions, embedded in an outdated law, is linked to an-
other seldom discussed anomaly of considerable social importance:
most union pension funds are under the exclusive control of corporate
management. Union influence is limited to jointly trusteed plans, with
equal representation of management and unions authorized by Sec-
tion 302(c) of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 (com-
monly known as the Taft-Hartley Act). 150 These Taft-Hartley funds,
with few exceptions, consist of multi-employer plans providing bene-
fits to numerous bargaining units within a particular industry. Ac-
cording to the most recent available data, the assets of jointly trusteed
funds include an estimated $180 billion in corporate equities. 51 All
other collectively bargained plans, with roughly $400 billion in corpo-
rate equities, 152 are administered by management in the same manner
as other employer-sponsored plans.
The Taft-Hartley Act was a conservative reaction to the growth of
union power in the 1940s, which was enacted shortly after a crippling
coal strike of the United Mine Workers led by their autocratic leader,
John L. Lewis. 153 Initially, Lewis pressed for a stipulated employer
150. 29 U.S.C. § 186(c)(5) (2007).
151. This estimate is based on funded assets of $307 billion in 2003 as reported by PENSION
BENEFIT GUARANTY CORPORATION, PENSION INSURANCE DATA BOOK 2005, at 92, tbl. M-9,
available at http://www.pbgc.gov/docs/2005databook.pdf. Following a GAO report, it assumes
that fifty-five percent of the assets consist of equity holdings. See GENERAL ACCOUNTING OF-
FICE, PRIVATE PENSIONS, MULTIEMPLOYER PLANS FACE SHORT- AND LONG- TERM CHAL-
LENGES 10 (Mar. 2004).
152. The starting point in this estimate is the Department of Labor's compilation of Form
5500 reports, which show total assets of collectively bargained plans to be $1,117 billion. Unfor-
tunately the figure overstates the assets of these plans to an undeterminable degree because
some collectively bargained plans cover non-bargaining units. See EMPLOYEE BENEFITS SECUR-
ITY ADMINISTRATION, supra note 22, at 7 tbl. A6. The estimate of roughly $400 billion rests on
the assumption that the assets of non-bargaining units included in this Department of Labor's
figure are in the range of ten to fifteen percent of the total. I deduct the funded assets of multi-
employer plans, as reported to the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation, from eighty-five to
ninety percent of the reported total assets of collectively bargained plans and assume that 60
percent of assets are invested in equities, following a GAO estimate. See PENSION BENEFIT
GUARANTY CORPORATION, supra note 151, at 92, tbl. M-9, and GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE,
supra note 151, at 10.
153. For a brief history of the pension provision, see Stephen Fogdall, Exclusive Union Con-
trol of Pension Funds: Taft-Hartley's Ill-Considered Prohibition, 4 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 215,
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payment per ton of coal to a welfare fund controlled by the union.
Although he settled for a jointly trusteed fund, the demand raised the
spector of unchecked union power over a serious accumulation of cap-
ital. Speaking on Section 305(c), Senator Taft explained,
The occasion of the amendment was the demand made by the
United Mine Workers of America that a tax of 10 cents a ton be
levied on all coal mined, and that the tax so levied be paid into a
general welfare fund to be administered by the union for practically
any purpose the union considered to come within the term
'welfare. 154
Such a fund, he claimed, would in effect become "a war chest, if you
please, for the union. ' 155 Senator Byrd warned that similar demands
were on the agenda of other unions. If the unions got their way, "it
would mean a complete destruction of the private enterprise system in
the U.S. ' 156
As enacted, Section 302 broadly prohibits any employer from pay-
ing "money or other thing of value" to any labor organization or to
"any representative of any of his employees. ' 157 Employer contribu-
tions to union-administered pension plans are included in this prohibi-
tion, but subdivision (c)(5) makes an exception for payments to a trust
fund established for the purpose of paying pensions or other specified
benefits, provided "employees and employers are equally represented
in the administration of such fund, together with such neutral persons
as the representatives of the employers and the representatives of em-
ployees may agree upon."'1 58
Today, the concerns that led to the enactment of Section 305 belong
to history. Union membership in the private sector has declined from
a peak of over thirty percent in the mid-1950s to less than nine per-
cent.159 Approximately thirty percent of the assets of collectively bar-
gained pension funds are invested in mutual funds and other
institutional investments under defined contribution plans.160 There is
scant possibility of using the funds as a "union war chest." The bal-
222-24 (2001); JEREMY RIFKIN & RANDY BARBER, THE NORTH WILL RISE AGAIN, PENSIONS,
POLITICS AND POWER IN THE 1980s 98-103 (1978); ROE, supra note 7, at 128-29.
154. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT 1947, at 1310-11,
printed for Subcomm. on Labor of the Comm. on Labor and Public Welfare, U.S. Senate (Jan.
1974).
155. Id. at 1311.
156. As cited in ROE, supra note 7, at 128-29.
157. 29 U.S.C. § 186(a)(2007)
158. 29 U.S.C. § 186(c)(5)(B)(2007).
159. See GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 151, at 4; Gary N. Chaison & Joseph B.
Rose, The Macrodeterminants of Union Growth and Decline, in THE STATE OF THE UNIONS, at 4
fig.1 (George Strauss, et al. eds., 1991).
160. See EMPLOYEE BENEFITS SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, supra note 22, at 7, tbl. A6.
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ance of the assets fund-defined benefit plans that have been subject to
multiple layers of regulation under ERISA, including fiduciary stan-
dards and prohibited transaction provisions, 161 elaborate disclosure
and reporting requirements, 162 and minimum funding rules that have
grown increasingly complex and rigid with successive legislation.1 63
The multiemployer plans allowed by the Taft-Hartley Act have es-
tablished a solid record that belies any claim that unions are unable to
work with management in their beneficiaries' interest. The plans are
ordinarily negotiated between a union and an employers' association
on a national or regional basis and are particularly well suited to in-
dustries, such as construction, with many small employers and a mo-
bile workforce. 164 They offer employees the advantage of portable
pension benefits within the trade and allow employers to rely on an
efficient central administration of pension benefits. 165 The boards of
trustees, which administer the plans, typically operate as separate enti-
ties with their own plan administrator or a contract administrator. 166
The fragmented constituencies of the boards can operate as a check
on negligence or abuse; if a union, or a particular employer is out of
line, other trustees are in a position to impose necessary discipline. 167
161. ERISA §§ 404, 406, codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 1104, 1106 (2007).
162. The agencies are the Department of Labor, the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation,
and the Internal Revenue Service. See generally Sharon E. Kazaras, Reporting and Disclosure
Requirements for Plans Covered by ERISA, in ERISA: A COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE 2-1 (Paul J.
Schneider & Barbara W. Freedman eds., 2d ed. 2003).
163. Jeffrey S. Myers, Minimum Funding Requirements, in ERISA: A COMPREHENSIVE
GUIDE, supra note 162, at 5-1.
164. NATIONAL COORDINATING COMMIT-EE FOR MULTIEMPLOYER PLANS, A BASIC GUIDE
TO MULTIEMPLOYER PLANS 3-5, 13-14 (2005); Reforming and Strengthening Defined Benefit
Plans: Examining the Health of the Multiemployer Pension System: Hearing Before the Subcomm.
on Education and the Workforce, 108th Cong. 38-40 (2004) (statement of Randy G. DeFrehn,
executive director of NCCMP).
165. NATIONAL COORDINATING COMMITTEE FOR MULTIEMPLOYER PLANS, supra note 164, at
4; Funding Rules for Multiemployer Defined Benefit Plans in H.R. 2830, The "Pension Protection
Act of 2005": Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Select Rev. Measures, 109th Cong. 36-37 (2005)
(statement of Judith Mazo, The Segal Company).
166. Paul J. Ondrasik, Jr. & Donald A. Walters, Utilizing Professional Advisors in Fulfilling
Fiduciary Responsbility, in TRUSTEES HANDBOOK, A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO LABOR-MANAGE-
MENT EMPLOYEE BENEFIT PLANS 122, 128 (Marc Gertner ed., 6th ed. 2006).
167. Schwab and Thomas write that "the joint union-management control of the trustees" is,
"[tihe most important check on investment abuses ... at least in theory," but "[d]espite the
balanced board membership, unions have tended to dominate these jointly managed funds."
Stewart J. Schwab & Randall Thomas, Realigning Corporate Governance: Shareholder Activism
by Labor Unions, 96 MICH. L. REV. 1018, 1076-1077 (1998). This generalization appears some-
what overly broad in light of the record of proxy voting, which reflects the choices of jointly
chosen investment managers. See discussion infra p. 41 and note 191. The responsibilities of
management trustees are by no means pro forma in nature. See TRUSTEE'S HANDBOOK, supra
note 166, passim; NATIONAL COORDINATING COMMITTEE FOR MULTIEMPLOYER PLANS, supra
note 164, at 11-12. Management faces liability for unfunded vested benefits as a penalty for poor
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A team of researchers have provided an illuminating study of the Cen-
tral Pension Fund serving the International Union of Operating Engi-
neers. In this exemplary pension fund, they found that the employer
and union representatives on the board of trustees were professionally
removed from collective bargaining and reached decisions by a pro-
cess of consensus, relying heavily on retained actuaries, accountants
and attorneys. 168
The assets of multiemployer plans grew at an annual average rate of
11.7 percent from 1980 to 2000, exceeding the average 10.5 percent
rate of single-employer plan assets even though they typically adopted
a more conservative asset allocation than corporate defined-benefit
plans.' 69 The conservative investment policy has stood them well in
adverse times; 170 the Taft-Hartley plans have an extraordinarily low
rate of failure. From 1980 to 2004, the Pension Benefit Guarantee
Corporation provided assistance to only 33 multiemployer plans as
compared to 296 single-employer plans. 171 Five years ago, corporate
plans sank into a deep crisis caused by low interest rates and a stock
market decline. Taft-Hartley plans are also in difficulty, but, in the
words of a GAO study, "the plans are not experiencing anywhere near
the magnitude of the problems that have recently afflicted the single-
employer plans."'1 72 In 2003, 87 percent of multi-employer plans had
fully funded vested benefits while only 25 percent of single employer
plans were fully funded. 173
management of the fund. See Paul J. Schneider, Withdrawal Liability under the Multiemployer
Pension Plan Amendments Act, in ERISA: A COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE, supra note 162, at 11-1.
168. See TERESA GHILARDUCCI ET AL., PORTABLE PENSION PLANS FOR CASUAL LABOR
MARKETS: LESSONS FROM THE OPERATING ENGINEERS' CENTRAL PENSION FUND 177-180
(1995). Many Taft-Hartley trusts, however, do not achieve this degree of independence. The
conflict of interest affecting union trustees with collective bargaining obligations persists in many
plans and has been repeatedly recognized in judicial decisions. See David W. Silverman, Trustees
and Bargaining Parties, in TRUSTEE'S HANDBOOK, supra note 166, at 50.
169. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 151, at 9. Taft-Hartley funds have typically
invested 50 to 55 percent of their assets in corporate equities. See Statement of DeFrehn, supra
note 164, at 41; GHILARDUCCI, supra note 123, at 47-48.
170. See Alicia H. Munnell, Who Should Manage the Assets of Collectively Bargained Pension
Plans?, NEW ENG. ECON. REV., July/Aug. 1983, at 28 (finding Taft-Hartley plans in prior ten
years "have performed very much like the universe as a whole"). But due to their conservative
asset allocations, the investment returns of Taft-Hartley funds have lagged somewhat below sin-
gle-employer funds during periods of rapidly rising stock prices. GHILARDUCCI, supra note 123,
at 142; Legislative Hearings on H.R. 2664: Hearings before the Subcomm. on Labor-Management
Relations of the Comm. on Education and Labor, 101st Cong. 41-43 (1990), printed in H.R. REP.
No. 101-89 (1990).
171. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 151, at 18.
172. Id. at 26.
173. NATIONAL COORDINATING COMMITrEE FOR MULTIEMPLOYER PLANS, supra note 164, at
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One of the unforeseen consequences of the Taft-Hartley Act has
been to bar the emergence of cooperative or non profit retirement
benefit providers with links to labor organizations. A union-owned
insurance company, Union Labor Life Insurance Company (now Ul-
lico, Inc) does exist and represents one possible model. Reflecting the
vision of Samuel Gompers, Ullico was founded in 1925 a year after his
death. It operates as a privately held corporation with stock generally
restricted to unions and is governed by a board of directors composed
of union leaders. Today it provides group life insurance to 800,000
union members as well as other insurance and investment products,
but it has been left knocking at the door of the retirement plan mar-
ket. It offers certain consulting services and pooled investment trusts
as investment options for Taft-Hartley plans,174 but, unlike other in-
surance companies, it is not able to offer variable annuities as a 401(k)
option or to enter the large market for tax-deferred annuities for non-
profit organizations and public school teachers authorized by Internal
Revenue Code Section 403(b). 175
An alternative model is suggested by TIAA-CREF. A nonprofit
annuity provider, Teachers Insurance and Annuity Association, joined
with a newly organized affiliate, College Retirement Equities Fund, to
market retirement plans, with voluntary participation, to employees in
private educational and research institutions. Such packaged plans of-
fered to multiple employers remain outside the sphere of ERISA reg-
ulation. 176 The corporate governance structure of TIAA-CREF
possesses internal checks lacking in Ullico, Inc. A supervisory board
oversees the performance of TIAA and CREF, which operate as two
separate companies with their own boards of directors, and pension
plan beneficiaries participate in the selection of company directors.1 77
174. See Ullico 2005 annual report, at http://www.ullico.com (follow to the 2005 annual report,
p. 5 and note 1). For information on Ullico's pooled investment accounts, see Michael
Calabrese, Building on Success: Labor-Friendly Investment Vehicles and the Power of Private
Equity, in WORKING CAPITAL, supra note 123, at 99-102, 114-116.
175. For surveys of the tax qualification rules of Internal Revenue Code section 403(b), see
David A. Pratt, Very Serious Business: Sense and Nonsense under 403(b) of the Internal Revenue
Code of 1986, 59 ALB. L. REV. 1197 (1996); 2 MICHAEL J. CANAN, QUALIFIED RETIREMENT
PLANS 95-119 (2006 ed.).
176. A plan qualified under Internal Revenue Code § 403(b) will not be regarded as a pension
plan "established and maintained by an employer" within the meaning of ERISA § 3(2), 29
U.S.C. § 1002(2) (2007), if it meets the conditions specified in 29 C.F.R. § 2510.3-2(f) (2007).
Among other things, these conditions require that employee participation is voluntary, all con-
tractual rights are enforceable by the employee, and the involvement of the employer is limited
to holding an annuity contract in the employer's name and performing certain other minor ad-
ministrative functions.
177. See GOVERNING TIAA-CREF, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE TIAA-CREF GOVERNANCE
SYSTEM, at http://www.tiaa-cref.org.
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It is now a familiar and respected institution in the educational and
research communities.
Ullico, Inc. has kept faith with the union constituency for 80 years,
despite some financial buffeting;178 it is surely unfair that it has been
legislatively denied the logical and profitable paths of expansion pur-
sued by other similar insurance companies. TIAA-CREF has shown
the value of a membership-responsive company providing packaged
retirement plans to multiple employers within a professional constitu-
ency. There is an unmet need for similar multiple employer plans in
other segments of the economy, particularly in the healthcare, non-
profit, and public school communities, where private retirement plans
are still dominated by insurance companies providing unregulated an-
nuities under IRC 403(b).1 79 Without the restrictions of Taft-Hartley,
labor unions in this sector of the economy might have been instrumen-
tal in establishing plans on the successful model of TIAA-CREF. 180
It is easy enough to recognize Section 302 of the Taft-Hartley Act as
a legislative anomaly with a peculiar historical explanation, but it is
more difficult to say what should replace it. The question was
squarely posed in 1990 when Representative Peter Visclovsky intro-
duced legislation that would have made a jointly managed board of
trustees on the Taft-Hartley model mandatory for all corporate pen-
sion plans, whether or not under a collective bargaining agreement.
Supporters of the legislation argued that mandatory reforms must ap-
ply to all pension plans. The proposed legislation, H.R. 2664, called on
the Department of Labor to supervise secret-ballot elections of trust-
ees representing employee constituencies.
The bill gained 46 co-sponsors 18 1 and drew strong support of labor
unions and vehement opposition of management. A hearing before
the Subcommittee on Education and Labor revealed an ideological
178. Ullico has recently recovered from a period of restructuring probably due to defects in its
organizational structure. See Ullico 2005 annual report, supra note 174, notes 1 and 14k.
179. Tom Lauricella, Teachers Have Few Defenses When Investing in 403(b)s, at http://www.
post-gazette.com/pg05237/559905.stm. See also http://www.403bwise.com for an array of infor-
mation on 403(b) plans. Fees for such insurance products can be high and are not always fully
disclosed. See PENSION AND WELFARE BENEFITS ADMINISTRATION, STUDY OF 401(K) PLAN
FEES AND EXPENSES 17, 27-28 (Apr. 13, 1998).
180. In 2005, union representation among healthcare practitioner and technical occupations
was 14.4% and among healthcare support occupations it was 10.7%. See http://www.bls.gov/
news.release/union2.t03.htm. All states have public teacher retirement systems, but 403(b) plans
are still marketed to school districts that are not to affiliated with the public system or that wish
supplemental retirement benefits. See generally, CYNTHIA L. MOORE, NATIONAL COUNCIL ON
TEACHER RETIREMENT, PROTECTING RETIREES' MONEY (5th ed. 2005); NATIONAL EDUCA-
TIONAL ASSOCIATION, CHARACTERISTICS OF 100 LARGE PUBLIC PENSION PLANS (Nov. 2002).




divide as labor claimed the right to control workers' pension funds
and management viewed pensions as a form of compensation within
the purview of personnel administration.' 82 Management representa-
tives maintained that corporate pension funds were on a sound foot-
ing - an argument that could not be made today - and raised three
more weighty objections. First, the election of employee representa-
tives would place an impossible burden on the Department of Labor.
An IBM executive explained that the company employed a popula-
tion of 200,000 in 325 locations in 50 states.183 Secondly, the adminis-
tration of pension benefits through a jointly trusteed board, with
elected employee representatives, would put an additional burden on
pension plans, giving management an incentive to withdraw or sim-
plify benefit programs. Thirdly, management representatives pointed
out that the Taft-Hartley Act does not prohibit negotiation of jointly
trusteed plans with single employers, but only a handful of such plans
exist.184 They inferred that the establishment of jointly trusteed plans
was not really a priority of labor.'8 5 A labor consultant countered that
unions are subject to a legal handicap in negotiating a jointly trusteed
plan. In his experience, management uniformly refused to negotiate
the composition of the pension board on the ground that it was a per-
missive rather than a mandatory subject of bargaining.18 6
An amendment incorporating the Visclovsky bill was defeated by a
vote of 250 to 173 and a similar bill introduced in the mid-1990s also
failed. 187 The episode serves to underscore the practicality of the
more modest model of fiduciary reform offered by the British Pension
Act 1995. This incremental reform avoids the management objections
raised against the Visclovsky bill, while leaving labor free to extend its
participation in pension benefit programs by negotiation and institu-
tional innovation. The British formula for selecting a one-third minor-
ity contingent of employee trustees by a principle-based process
182. Legislative Hearings on H.R. 2664, supra note 170.
183. Id. at 142.
184. Examples included Newspaper Guide and New York Times; Machinists and TWA Air-
lines; and Airlines Pilots Association and TWA Airlines, United Airlines and Pan Am Airlines.
Id. at 188, 310.
185. Union leadership has long advocated worker participation in pension fund management.
Id. at 170, 200, 381. But Levin suggests that union officials at a local level frequently prefer to
leave the management of pension plans to the employer in order to avoid exposure to criticism,
presumably because they lack experience and organizational support for assuming this highly
technical responsibility. NOEL ARNOLD LEVIN, ERISA AND LABOR MANAGEMENT BENEFIT
FUNDS 354 (2d ed. 1975).
186. Legislative Hearings on H.R. 2664, supra note 170, at 94.
187. Id. at 25; GHILARDUCCI, supra note 123, at 178.
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would allow for a transitional period of improvisation and experimen-
tation without disrupting pension administration. 188
Our analysis leads to the need for three modifications in the Taft-
Hartley Act and its administration. Two additional exceptions to the
general prohibition of the Act should be added to section 302(c): (1)
annuities offered by a union-owned insurance company (the Ullico
model) and (2) pension plans offered by a multiple employer plan,
with cooperative or member-regulated form of organization (the
TIAA-CREF model). Lastly, without resort to legislation, the De-
partment of Labor can lay to rest by an opinion letter the notion that
a demand for a jointly trusteed plan is not a mandatory subject of
bargaining under section 8(d) of the National Labor Relations Act.
The decision most closely on point supports this point of view and
there is no contrary authority. 18 9
The subject of collectively bargained pension funds abounds with
false concerns about the exercise of union power to promote special
interests. Some Taft-Hartley funds, particularly in the construction in-
dustry, have experimented in investing to promote jobs, but the so-
called economically targeted investments have generally been cau-
tious and financially rewarding; they have proven to be consistent with
the conservative investment policies of the funds. 190 Experience has
188. For non-union employees, a two-staged election procedure would reduce the risk of man-
agement manipulation of the selection of employee representatives. Groups of perhaps 50 to
250 employees would elect representatives who would then select the pension trustees from
among their number. Research reveals that there is a cognitive limit on the number of individu-
als with whom a person can maintain a stable relationship and the typical limit is about 150
individuals. See R.I.M. Dunbar, Coevolution of neocortal size, group size and language, 16
BEHAV. & BRAIN Sci. 681, 685-687 (1993). Elections within such employee groups are less vul-
nerable to management manipulation because employees will rely on existing personal relation-
ships or those of trusted coleagues. This two-stage process could be adapted to other purposes,
such as employee participation in the nomination of corporate board members and the forma-
tion of an employee committee to review corporate contributions - an exemplary practice of
Adobe Systems. Personal communication with Charles Geschke, founder and CEO (Oct. 29,
2006).
189. Pension benefits are a mandatory subject of collective bargaining under section 8(d) of
the National Labor Relation Act. Chem. Workers v. Pittsburgh Glass, 404 U.S. 157, 159 (1971).
Cent. Fla. Sheet Metal v. NLRB, 664 F.2d 489, 501 (5th Cir. 1981) holds that the mechanism for
selection of a trustee in a multiemployer plan has a "sufficient nexus" to the "efficient and stable
administration" of pension benefits to come within the subject of pension benefits. The same
reasoning should apply to the organization and composition of the governing board of a pension
plan.
190. See Calabrese, supra note 174; Jayne E. Zanglein, Overcoming Institutional Barriers on
the Economically Targeted Investment Superhighway, in WORKING CAPITAL, supra note 123, at
181; Thomas M. Griffin, Investing Labor Union Pension Funds in Workers: How ERISA and the
Common Law Trust May Benefit Labor by Economically Targeting Investment, 32 SuFFOLK U. L.
REV. 11 (1998). Economically targeted investments usually make up no more than 5% of a Taft-
Hartley fund portfolio. See Tessa Hebb, Introduction: the Challenge of Labor's Capital Strategy,
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shown that Taft-Hartley plans do not vote as a cohesive bloc in proxy
contests. Many Taft-Hartley plans follow, to varying degrees, the
proxy voting guidelines of the AFL-CIO, but others disregard these
guidelines. 191 The elements of the guidelines that directly concern
worker interests, such as stock options, employee training and foreign
contracting, seldom figure in proxy voting. As shareholder activists,
unions have pragmatically sought informal coalitions with other share-
holders on issues calculated to gain widespread support. In particular,
they have emphasized issues relating to corporate governance proce-
dures, management entrenchment and executive compensation - all
matters relating to the long-term health of the corporation rather than
to specific worker interests.192
The empirical record shows that union funds in fact have a unique
potential in evolution of a more responsive system of corporate gov-
ernance. Unions have an incentive to consider the long-term strength
of management since workers cannot shift jobs with the ease that an
investment manager can change stocks in a portfolio. Many unions
can draw on the expertise of research staffs and possess sophisticated
understanding of compensation issues.' 93 Moreover, union leaders
tend to calculate the cost/benefit ration of shareholder activism differ-
ently from most other institutional investors, seeing political benefits
and enhanced public credibility in advocating popular causes.' 94
Though marginal in size and surprisingly moderate, the union-influ-
enced funds have the potential of acting as a catalyst in forming new
patterns of corporate monitoring.
in WORKING CAPITAL, supra note 123, at 11. In Interpretative Bulletin 94-1, the Department of
Labor approved the consideration of collateral benefits, such as job creation, in the choice of
investments, provided the investments otherwise meet fiduciary standards. The concept of eco-
nomically targeted investments, however, has been repeatedly attacked at a theoretical level.
See, e.g., Edward A. Zelinsky, Economically Targeted Investments: a Critical Analysis, 6 KAN. J.
L. & PUB. POL'y 39 (1997).
191. Marleen O'Connor, Labor's Role in the Shareholder Revolution, in WORKING CAPITAL
supra note 123, at 79; Jayne Elizabeth Zanglein, From Wall Street Walk to Wall Street Talk: the
Changing Face of Corporate Governance, 11 DEPAUL Bus. L.J. 43, 86 (1998).
192. See Schwab & Thomas, supra note 167, at 1036-1040, 1086-1088 (1998); Zanglein, supra
note 191, at 73-79, 87-97. The AFL-CIO Guidelines may be found at http://www.aflcio.org/
corporatewatch. For data on union-supported proposals in 2005, see GEORGESON SHARE-
HOLDER, ANNUAL CORPORATE GOVERNANCE REVIEW figs. 4, 7, 14, available at http://www.
georgesonshareholder.com (research and press releases).
193. Schwab & Thomas, supra note 167, at 1037, 1086.
194. I am relying on Prof. O'Connor's discussion of this point. See Marleen O'Connor, La-
bor's Role in the American Corporate Governance Structure, 22 CoMP. LAB. L. & POL'Y J. 97,
122-123 (2000); Marleen O'Connor, Organized Labor as Shareholder Activist: Building Coali-
tions to Promote Worker Capitalism, 31 U. RICH. L. REV. 1345, 1381-1383 (1997).
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E. The Strange Case of FERS
The legislative neglect of corporate governance has taken a pecu-
liarly strange turn in the case of the Thrift Savings Plan of the Federal
Employees Retirement System (FERS). Established 20 years ago by
the Federal Employees' Retirement System Act of 1986,195 the Plan
offers a defined-contribution pension plan to federal workers as a sup-
plement to their civil service pension benefits. The assets of the FERS
Thrift Savings Plan have grown to over $170 billion and are increasing
substantially year by year.196 Approximately $100 billion are in three
index funds of corporate equities administered by Barclays Global In-
vestors, NA., under contract with the FERS Board. 197 The 1986 legis-
lation expressly prohibits the retirement system board or any federal
agency or employee from exercising "voting rights associated with the
ownership of securities by the Thrift Savings Fund."'198 Hence, Bar-
clays, a division of a global banking firm, votes proxies for the federal
employees pension fund without consultation with beneficiaries or
democratically selected pension managers.
The anomaly arose as the result of a dilemma awkwardly resolved
in conference committee. Congress was justifiably concerned about
the possibility of political manipulation of the fund, particularly by
parties affected by federal procurement and regulatory powers. 199
Both the House and Senate agreed that the specter of such manipula-
tion would be minimized by requiring corporate equities to be in-
vested in index funds that were essentially self-managed and do not
require extensive day-to-day investment decisions.200 As a further
precaution, the Senate Bill called for the exercise of proxy voting
rights by an employee advisory committee, separate from the manag-
ing board of the retirement system. The House Bill lacked this provi-
sion. 20 1 The final legislation created an employee advisory committee
but withheld proxy voting powers from the committee as well as from
195. Pub. L. No. 99-335, 100 Stat. 517 (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. § 8401 through 8479
(2007)).
196. See Financial Statements of the Thrift Savings Fund-2005 and 2004, at http://www.tsp.
gov/forms/financial-stmt.pdf. The annual report discloses assets of $172 billion on December 31,
2005, and $151 billion at the close of the previous year. In 2005, contributions were $18 billion
and benefits paid $5 billion. Asset appreciation and other factors account for the balance of the
increase in asset value.
197. See http://www.tsp.gov/curinfo/pressrel/index-2006.html.
198. 5 U.S.C. § 8438(f) (2007).
199. 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1479, 1519-21.
200. See 131 CONG. REc. part 22, S8493 at 31066 (Nov. 7, 1985) (statement of Sen. Stevens, a
sponsor of the legislation).
201. 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1479, 1520-1521; 131 CONG. REC. part 22, S8493 at 31055.
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the retirement system board, leaving proxy voting by default to the
investment manager of the index funds.202
The equity investments of the FERS Thrift Savings Plan now ac-
count for 0.6 percent of the total capitalization of the U.S. equity mar-
ket.20 3 The responsible exercise of proxy voting rights to this fund is
important enough to be included in a program of corporate govern-
ance reform. One possible approach is suggested by the Railroad Re-
tirement and Survivors Improvement Act of 2001, which transferred
$18 billion of assets from an existing retirement account to a newly
created entity, the National Railroad Retirement Investment Trust. 20 4
The Trust is managed by a seven-member board of trustees which is
directed to invest in accordance with accepted portfolio management
principles. 20 5 Three members of the board are selected by railroad
unions; three by railroad management; and the seventh member is se-
lected jointly by the union and management members. Since it was
established on February 1, 2002, the assets of the trust increased to
$27.6 billion by September 30, 2005.206 The investments in U.S. equi-
ties amounted to 40% of the Trust portfolio20 7 and were voted in com-
pliance with a proxy voting policy. 20 8
The National Railroad Retirement Investment Trust offers an excel-
lent model for the large mass of federal employees belonging to agen-
cies that provide services unrelated to federal regulatory and
procurement powers. The Postal Service with more than 700,000 em-
ployees20 9 falls within this category and is a participant in the Federal
Employees Retirement System. 210 The list of non-politically sensitive
agencies could be extended to include such agencies as the Library of
Congress, National Archives, Government Printing Office, Depart-
ment of Veterans Affairs, and perhaps also the Social Security Admin-
istration. 211 There is no reason why the supplemental pension plans of
202. See MONKS & MINOW, supra note 111, at 153-155, for a personal interpretation of the
legislative history. Monks was a founding trustee of the FERS board. See also http://www.ragm.
com.
203. SECURITIES INDUSTRY FACTBOOK 2006, supra note 3, at 69.
204. Pub. L. No. 107-90, § 105, 115 Stats 882 (codified as amended at 45 U.S.C. § 231n (2007)).





210. 39 U.S.C. § 1005(d)(1) (2007).
211. At the end of 2001, the social security administration had over 50,000 employees in exclu-
sive recognition units, and the Department of Veteran Affairs had over 150,000 employees in
such units. U.S. OFFICE OF PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT, UNION RECOGNITION IN THE FEDERAL
GOVERNMENT AS OF JANUARY 2001, OWR-58, at 63, 321 (Mar. 2002).
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employees working for agencies immune from political pressure
should be burdened by concerns relating to the procurement and reg-
ulatory powers of other federal agencies.
The Senate version of the 1986 legislation still remains an attractive
alternative. The exercise of proxy voting rights by an employee panel
separate from the fund management reduces the risk of political mis-
use of the funds to something close to the vanishing point. Any re-
maining concern about the centralized exercise of proxy voting power
in a federal employees' plan could be addressed by disaggregating the
proxy voting process. The equity index fund of the International
Brotherhood of Electrical Workers suggests a possible procedure. The
fund delegates the exercise of proxy voting rights to a consulting firm
that follows the AFL-CIO's proxy voting guidelines.212 Federal un-
ions could similarly be authorized to delegate to an investment adviser
the exercise of voting rights to the portion of the Thrift Savings Plan
proportional to their members' contributions, subject to terms regu-
lated by the Employee Advisory Council. The federal workforce is
represented by a complex diversity of unions.2 13 The devolution of
proxy voting rights under a multiplicity of contracts, regulated by an
agency distinct from fund management, would effectively dispel the
possibility of political manipulation of equity investments.
F. Employee-directed 401(k) Plans
The subject of 401(k) plans and corporate governance takes us
through complex terrain, marked by incidental disclosure issues, and
leads in the end to a familiar conclusion: the fiduciary structure of
ERISA poorly serves the interests of beneficiaries and has other un-
fortunate effects on the larger system of corporate governance in the
United States. I will briefly sketch the institutional setting and disclo-
sure issues and then focus on the fiduciary issues that pertain most
closely to our inquiry.
1. Institutional Setting
At the outset, it is necessary to observe some legal distinctions. The
phenomenon of 401(k) plans involves the convergence of distinct pro-
visions of the Internal Revenue Code and ERISA. Internal Revenue
Code Section 401(k) allows an employee to defer taxation on a por-
tion of his or her compensation by contributing it to a qualified pen-
212. Calabrese, supra note 174, at 119.
213. See U.S. OFFICE OF PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT, supra note 211.
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sion plan.214 An entirely separate provision of ERISA, Section
404(c), provides an exception to the generally applicable fiduciary
rules of 404(a) where a plan gives the participant the power to choose
among designated investment alternatives.215 Not all plans under ER-
ISA Section 404(c) qualify under Internal Revenue Code Section
401(k), and some Section 401(k) plans do not contain a menu of in-
vestment options coming within Section 404(c). Nevertheless, the bulk
of 401(k) plans come within ERISA Section 404(c). According to a
recent study, 87 percent of medium and large 401(k) plans offer em-
ployees a menu of investment options that will ordinarily bring them
within the fiduciary rules of ERISA Section 404(c). 216
At the time ERISA was enacted in 1974, it was not possible to defer
taxation on a portion of an employee's contribution that the employee
might elect to contribute to a retirement plan. Plans providing for
such elective contributions were funded with after-tax dollars. Begin-
ning with the 1980 tax year, Section 401(k) allowed employees for the
first time to defer tax on a percent of their compensation that they
chose to contribute to a plan meeting certain participation and with-
drawal requirements. 217 The plans proved popular with both employ-
ers and employees, though for different reasons.218
In 1994, the assets in 401(k) plans amounted to $675 billion and by
2005 the assets stood at $2,443 billion,219 about half of which was in-
vested in domestic corporate stock, or roughly 7 percent of the total
U.S. equity market.220 Today 401(k) plans account for 26 percent of
all retirement plan assets (excluding annuities and IRAs) 221 and their
relative importance is growing. They cover about half of employees
benefited by a retirement plan and account for almost two thirds of
214. See CANAN, supra note 175, at $ 3:107 et seq.
215. 29 U.S.C. § 1104(c) (2007).
216. OLIVIA S. MITCHELL, NEW TRENDS IN PENSION BENEFIT AND RETIREMENT PROVISIONS,
at 24, tbl. 30B (National Bureau of Economic Research, Working Paper 7381, 1999).
217. See Revenue Act of 1978, Pub. L. No 95-600, § 135(c), 95th Cong. (effective for plan
years after December 31, 1979).
218. ALICIA H. MUNNEL & ANNIKA SUNDEN, COMING UP SHORT, THE CHALLENGE OF
401(K) PLANS 2-5 (2004) (explains popularity of plans and sketches history of the provision).
219. INVESTMENT COMPANY INSTITUTE, THE U.S. RETIREMENT MARKET 2005 fig. 7 (15 Re-
search Fundamentals, No. 5, July 2006).
220. Id. at fig. 10. The calculation of one half of assets includes 15 percent of assets invested
in employer stock. See infra note 229. It assumes that 60% of hybrid funds shown in fig. 10 were
invested in stock and that the total U.S. equity market was $17, 389 billion in 2005. See SECURI-
TIES INDUSTRY ASSOCIATION, supra note 3, at 19.
221. INVESTMENT COMPANY INSTITUTE, supra note 219, at figs. 1, 7.
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new plan contributions to retirement plans, assuring that most retire-
ment plans in the future will fall within this category.222
The rapid increase in 401(k) plans has been accompanied by an-
other phenomenon of historic importance: the dramatic growth of mu-
tual funds.223 Between 1980 and 1999 the net assets of mutual funds
grew at an average rate of over 20 percent.2 24 U.S. equities held by
mutual funds rose from 122.9 billion in 1985 to 8.9 trillion in 2005.225
At the beginning of the new century, corporate stock in mutual funds
represented almost 23 percent of all publicly traded U.S. corporate
equity.2 26 Since mutual fund managers actively engage in trading, mu-
tual funds account for the bulk of equity trading and have a dominant
influence in stock-market pricing.227
The role of 401(k) plans in corporate governance is a subplot of the
larger drama of the influence of mutual funds on the U.S. corporation.
Apart from employer stock - a topic outside our inquiry - nearly all
the equities invested in 401(k) plans are in mutual funds.2 28 These
equity investments made through mutual funds constitute at least 40
percent of the assets in 401(k) plans.229 The growth of mutual funds
222. Susan J. Stabile, Freedom to Choose Unwisely: Congress's Misguided Decision to Leave
401(k) Plan Participants to Their Own Devices, 11 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 361, 362 (2002).
223. Mutual funds are management investment companies under the Investment Company
Act of 1940 (See 15 U.S.C. § 80a-1 through 80a-64 (2007)) and fall into two categories, open-end
mutual funds and closed-end mutual funds. Approximately 85 percent of investment company
assets are held by open-end mutual fund, which issue securities that are redeemable at any time.
Closed-end funds issue securities in traditional offerings that are later traded in secondary mar-
kets. See Victoria E. Schonfeld & Thomas M. J. Kerwin, Organization of a Mutual Fund, 459
Bus. LAW. 107, 111 (1993).
224. SMITH & WALTER, supra note 143, at 131.
225. Alan R. Palmiter, Mutual Fund Voting of Portfolio Shares: Why not Disclose?, 23 CAR-
DOZO L. REV. 1419, 1426 (2002).
226. Compare SECURrrIES INDUSTRY AsSOCIATION, supra note 3, at 69, with Proxy Voting by
Investment Companies, Securities Act Release No. 8188 (Transfer Binder 2002-2003), Fed. Sec.
L. Rep. (CCH), 86826, at 87,144 (Jan. 31, 2003).
227. SMITH & WALTER, supra note 143, at 121.
228. PENSION AND WELFARE BENEFITS ADMINISTRATION, STUDY OF 401(K) PLAN FEES AND
EXPENSES, at 2.4, 2.5 (Apr. 13, 1998) [hereinafter DOL Fee Study].
229. INVESTMENT COMPANY INSTITUTE, supra note 219, at figs. 8, 10 (calculation assumes that
60% of hybrid funds in table 10 are in equities). Employer stock currently accounts for 15% of
plan assets. See Alicia H. Munnel & Annika Sunden, 401(k) Plans are Still coming up Short,
ISSUE IN BRIEF No. 43, at 4 (Center for Retirement Research at Boston College, Mar. 2006). A
separate publication of the Investment Company Institute gives a significantly higher estimate of
mutual fund equity holdings based on 2003 data. See Sarah Holden & Jack VanDerhei, 401(k)
Plan Assets Allocation, Account Balances, and Loan Activity in 2003, 10 PERSP., No. 2, at 2
(Investment Company Institute, August, 2004) (45 percent in equity funds and 9 percent in bal-
anced funds). It reports that guaranteed investment contracts and other stable value funds of-
fered by insurance companies and banks account for about 13 percent of assets; bond funds for
10 percent; and money market funds for 5 percent. The balance presumably consists of group
variable annuities, participant brokerage accounts, and other investment vehicles administered
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has been stimulated in part by the popularity of 401(k) plans. The
401(k) market represents about 25 percent of the total business of mu-
tual funds;230 and 45 percent of the market for individual retirement
accounts - representing approximately 15 percent of the mutual fund
market - represents rollovers of lump sum distributions from 401(k)
and other defined contribution plans.231
In the deregulated environment of the 1990s, the market for 401(k)
assets and mutual funds led to an interpenetration of markets by an
array of financial service firms and to the prominence of large inte-
grated financial service companies. The investment management
companies operating mutual funds offered their services as investment
managers to corporate sponsors of 401(k) and traditional plans. Com-
mercial banks launched their own families of mutual funds and com-
peted with insurance companies in the field of investment
management. Insurance companies expanded beyond their tradi-
tional sideline of annuity contracts into guaranteed investment con-
tracts and mutual fund ownership. 232 Investment advisers with staffs
of thousands of employees were found as departments of large finan-
cial conglomerates. 233
2. Conflicts of Interest
The profit-making incentive of the investment managers of pension
plans creates a basic conflict of interest issue: the managers wish to
increase fee income and assets under management, while pension plan
beneficiaries want the best possible risk-adjusted investment perform-
ance net of fees and expenses. ' 234 Proxy voting presents narrower
and more specific conflict of interest issues. Investment managers
have much to lose by courting corporate disfavor, especially when
they are aggressively seeking other lines of business. Anti-manage-
ment votes may invite reprisal or simply engender a reputation for
by financial service firms. See MUNNEL & SUNDEN, supra note 218, at 68-94. The Pension and
Welfare Benefits Administration gives a generally comparable breakdown of 401(k) assets based
on 1996 data. See DOL Fee Study, supra note 228, at 2.4.
230. In 2005 U.S.-regulated Investment Company Assets were $9.5 trillion; 94 percent of the
assets or 8.9 was held by mutual funds. INVESTMENT COMPANY INSTITUTE, THE INVESTMENT
COMPANY FACt BOOK, available at http://www.icifactbook.org/pdf/2006 factbook.pdf. For assets
of 401(k) plans, see references infra notes 219 and 221.
231. See INVESTMENT COMPANY INSTITUTE, supra note 219, at figs. 5-6.
232. SMITH & WALTER, supra note 143, at 121-138.
233. For information on the investment adviser industry, see the website of the Investment
Advisers Association (until recently Investment Counsel Association of America), at http://www.
icaa.org.
234. SMITH & WALTER, supra note 143, at 123.
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activism that is bad for profitable business relationships.2 35 Only a
relatively few corporate governance measures relating to takeover de-
fenses and management entrenchment have an immediate impact on
the market value of corporate stock, and their impact is of marginal
importance. 236 Thus, proxy-voting decisions figure little in an individ-
ual investment manager's quarterly performance record, even though
the decisions have an important system-wide impact on corporate
monitoring. Where mutual funds are actively managed (and most are),
investment managers are likely to have another compelling concern.
The managers commonly see their competitive advantage as depend-
ing on access to corporate executives for quality information. 237 They
may be reluctant to take any action that could antagonize corporate
executives who are in a position to issue invitations to briefings, re-
spond to inquiries and notify them of the release of sensitive
information.
The conventional remedies for conflict of interest are the superfi-
cially inconsistent strategies of disclosure and confidential voting. The
former is now in effect as the result of a 2003 SEC disclosure rule.
Recognizing the important impact of proxy voting by mutual funds,
the SEC required that, beginning with the 2003-2004 fiscal year, mu-
tual funds must file with the Commission a detailed record of how
they voted all proxies for the twelve-month period ending June 30.
The voting record must be filed no later than August 31 of the year
and must be made available to stockholders either on the fund's web-
site or on request. 238 The filings now reveal for the first time how mu-
tual funds exercise their proxy voting power.
As separately analyzed by researchers at Baruch College and the
University of Michigan, the proxy voting patterns of mutual funds
since mandatory disclosure reveal considerable differences among
funds and particular issues, but still display an alignment with manage-
ment positions that is sufficiently strong to frustrate the goal of corpo-
rate self-regulation.239 Of the ten largest fund families, Vanguard
235. PETER A. GOUREVITCH & JAMES J. SHINN, POLITICAL POWER AND CORPORATE CON-
TROL, THE NEW GLOBAL POLITICS OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 241 (2003).
236. See LUCIAN BEBCHUK ET AL., WHAT MATrERS IN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE? 6-9 (Olin
Center for Law, Economics and Business, Discussion Paper No. 491, 2004). The authors list
staggered boards, limits to amendment of by-laws, supra-majority requirements for mergers and
charter amendments, poison pills, and golden parachutes. Id.
237. Palmiter, supra note 225, at 1481.
238. See Securities Act Release No. 8188, supra note 226, at 87, 142. The release also requires
mutual funds to file statements of policies or practices guiding how they vote proxies for stocks
in their portfolio.
239. See GERALD F. DAVIS & E. HAN KIM, WOULD MUTUAL FUNDS BITE THE HAND THAT
FEEDS THEM? BUSINESS TIES AND PROXY VOTING (Stephen M. Ross School of Business, Uni-
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voted against management 29 percent of the time, though mostly on
issues where its vote had little effect;2 40 T. Rowe Price opposed man-
agement on only 8 percent of the votes.2 4 1 The compelling interest of
preserving access to corporate sources of information was evidence
among firms relying on such information. A group of funds that selec-
tively pick long-term positions in particular companies voted with
management on no less than 95 percent of the votes;242 similarly, the
broad category of actively managed funds voted with management
somewhat more often than index funds. 243 A certain tendency toward
herd behavior appeared in the nearly wholesale defection of funds
from management support of classified boards 244 and a frequent op-
position to management on anti-takeover and management entrench-
ment issues.245 The funds, however, generally supported management
on executive compensation issues, voting overwhelmingly against
measures to limit executive compensation and, by varying margins,
against most related proposals.2 46 In all, the Baruch study found that
the ten largest mutual funds favored management positions on 83 per-
cent of the votes, with most votes opposing management concentrated
in shareholder proposals related to management entrenchment issues
and takeover defenses. 247
Paradoxically, the long-championed practice of confidential voting
remains a viable strategy to complement mutual fund disclosure. 248
True, as one critic charged, confidentiality is the "exact opposite" of
disclosure. 249 But a rule requiring confidential voting of proxies
versity of Michigan, working paper, 2005) [hereinafter Michigan study]; BURTON ROTHBERG &
STEVEN LILIEN, MUTUAL FUNDS AND PROXY VOTING: NEW EVIDENCE ON CORPORATE GOV-
ERNANCE (Zicklin School of Business, Baruch College, working paper, 2005) [hereinafter Ba-
ruch study]. The Michigan study included data of 21 fund families; the Baruch study was limited
to the 10 fund families with largest equity holdings.
240. JOHN C. HARRINGTON, THE CHALLENGE TO POWER 286-287 (2005).
241. The Baruch study, supra note 239, at 15, 34.
242. Id. at 18-19, 36. The sample was based on a group of funds featured by the Wall Street
Journal as exemplars of this approach to investing.
243. Id. at 20, 36.
244. The Michigan study, supra note 239, at 19.
245. Id. at 20, Tables 4 and 5; the Baruch study, supra note 239, at 35.
246. Compare the Michigan study, supra note 239, at 17 ("essentially unanimous in voting
against limiting executive compensation") and the Baruch study, supra note 239, at 13 (13 per-
cent voted against management on "executive compensation").
247. The Baruch study, supra note 239, at 16, 35.
248. The idea of the secret ballot in corporate elections has a long history and today about 27
percent of S&P 500 companies have confidential voting procedures. See 5 Loss & SELIGMAN,
supra note 66, at 1967 -1968 n.133; Preamble, Securities Act Release No. 8188, supra note 226, at
87,149 n.35; MONKS & MINOW, supra note 111, at 231-232.
249. Roberta Romano, Does Confidential Proxy Voting Matter?, 32 J. LEGAL STUD. 465, 479
(2003).
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serves to shield fiduciary voting from management interference prior
to the shareholder meeting; the mutual fund disclosure rule allows
public scrutiny of voting two months or more after the shareholder
meeting.250 At this interval, proxy votes against management may be
less likely to draw corporate displeasure and will be offset by other
influences in the market. Confidential voting, however, is directed at a
minor manifestation of conflict of interest - actual intervention by
corporate executives in proxy voting. Because conflicts of interest op-
erate in pervasive and concurrent ways, it is not surprising that a cor-
poration's adoption of confidential voting has not historically changed
voting patterns significantly. Confidential voting belongs in a package
of corporate reforms as an assurance of propriety in corporate elec-
tions, but it does not itself have much impact on proxy voting.251
3. Fiduciary Issues
The modest effect of reforms based on disclosure or confidentiality
highlights the vital importance of the fiduciary structure of 401(k)
plans. The primary purpose of the fiduciary rules, however, pertains
to the beneficiaries' financial interest in securing a retirement income.
Considerations of corporate governance are persuasive only if they
are congruent with policies relating to the beneficiaries' interests in
the administration of retirement benefits. Thus, to reach the subject
of our inquiry, we must first examine the fiduciary rules governing
employee-directed plans and examine their effect in serving the bene-
ficiaries retirement needs.
The fiduciary provision governing the bulk of 401(k) plans, ERISA
Section 404(c), serves a function today that could not have been fore-
seen at the time ERISA was enacted.252 As discussed in an earlier
section, Section 404(a) was intended to incorporate the common law
fiduciary principles of trust law. Subsection (c) of Section 404 recog-
nized a rule of minor importance in trust law that was then pertinent
to certain savings plans funded with after-tax employee contribu-
250. In the preamble to the mutual fund disclosure rule, the SEC made this distinction in
rejecting arguments that the rule would undermine the principles of confidential voting. Securi-
ties Act Release No. 8188., supra note 226, at 87,149.
251. See Romano, supra note 249, at 487.
252. ERISA § 404(c) has come under close scrutiny in recent legal scholarship. Studies of
particular interest include: Stabile, supra note 222; Colleen E. Medill, The Individual Responsi-
bility Model of Retirement Plans Today: Conforming ERISA Policy to Reality, 49 EMORY L. J. 1
(2000); Jayne Elizabeth Zanglein, Investment Without Education: the Disparate Impact on




tions:253 the rule required the trustee to act in accordance with the
exercise of a power granted to the beneficiary or a third party by the
trust instrument.254 Applying the rule to retirement plans, subsection
(c) provided that, where a pension plan permits a beneficiary to exer-
cise control over the assets in an individual account, the plan fiduciary
is not liable for any loss resulting from the beneficiary's exercise of
such control.2 55 In the ERISA conference report, the explanation of
subdivision (c) occupies 2 paragraphs out of 152 pages and appears
under the heading 'certain individual account plans. ''256
With the historic shift toward 401(k) plans, the exception of 404(c)
has become the most common pattern for fiduciary relationships in
private employer-sponsored pension plans. In this new role, Section
404(c) effectively relieves the corporate sponsor of fiduciary responsi-
bility for the plan. It is true that ERISA offers the possibility of hold-
ing 404(c) fiduciaries accountable under the general fiduciary
standards in initially choosing or maintaining investment alternatives
in a 401(k) plan.257 But Section 404(c) offers a potent affirmative de-
fense that discouraged any litigation 258 until the post Enron and
WorldCom era.2 59 It is only in the past five years that the courts have
held corporate sponsors liable for selecting or failing to monitor an
253. Stabile, supra note 222, at 362 n.11.
254. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 185, provides: "If under the terms of the trust a
person has power to control the action of the trustee in certain respects, the trustee is undera
duty to act in accordance with the exercise of such power, unless the attempted exercise of the
power violates the terms of the trust or is a violation of a fiduciary duty to which such person is
subject in the exercise of the power."
255. ERISA § 404(c) states in pertinent part: "in the case of a pension plan which provides for
individual accounts and permits a articipant or beneficiary to exercise control over the assets in
his account, if a participant or beneficiary exercises control over the assets in his account (as
determined under regulations of the Secretary)- . . . (B) no person who is otherwise a fiduciary
shall be liable under this part for any loss,... which results from such participant's or benefici-
ary's exercise of control." 29 U.S.C. § 1104(c) (2007).
256. H.R. REP. No. 1280, at 5085-5086 (1974) (Conf.Rep.), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5038-5190.
257. See Letter from the Pension and Welfare Benefits Administration, U.S. Dept. of Labor,
to Douglas 0. Kant (Nov. 26, 1997) quoted in In re Enron Corp. Sec., Derivative & ERISA, 284
F. Supp. 2d 511, 578 (S.D.Tex. 2003). Medill discusses alternative scenarios for holding 401(k)
fiduciaries liable under this general fiduciary standard. See Colleen E. Medill, Stock Market
Volatility and 401(k) Plans, 34 MICH J. L. REFORM 469 (2001)
258. With regard to the status of section 404(c) as an affirmative defense, see In re Unisys Say.
Plan Litig., 74 F.3d 420, 444-445 (3d Cir. 1996); Woods v. S. Co., 396 F. Supp. 2d 1357, 1367 (N.D.
Ga. 2005); In re Sprint Corp, ERISA Litig., 388 F. Supp. 2d 1207, 1234 (D. Kan. 2004).
259. In 2003, the District Court in the Enron litigation remarked that "[t]here is little case law
regarding s 404(c) plans." See In re Enron, 284 F. Supp. 2d. at 575. But see Allison v. Bank One-
Denver, 289 F.3d 1223, 1238 (10th Cir. 2002) (finding that the fiduciary never implemented a
participant-directed option); In re Unisys Sav. Plan Litig., 74 F.3d 145, 443-448 (3d Cir 1996)
(holding that the employer had not established a 404(c) defense for purpose of summary judg-
ment); Franklin v. First Union Corp., 84 F. Supp. 2d 720, 731-732 (E.D.Va. 2000) (rejecting con-
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investment option, and the decisions have been confined to invest-
ment in employer stock, usually with matching employer stock contri-
butions.260 Even in this area, a plan provision restricting the
employee to investing no more than 50 percent of their contributions
in employer stock served to shield one employer from liability.26'
In 1992, recognizing the new importance of Section 404(c), the De-
partment of Labor issued regulations setting forth standards that must
be satisfied to give participants meaningful control over plan invest-
ments as required by the statute.2 62 First, the plan must offer "a broad
range of investment alternatives" that includes three diversified in-
vestment alternatives with "materially different risk and return char-
acteristics. '263 The prologue to the regulations describes these
investments as the "core" investment alternatives. 264 The partici-
pants, however, are free to decide whether or not to make such diver-
sified investments. If they wish, they may place all their investments in
fixed-income securities or employer stock. Secondly, the plan must
give participants an effective power to instruct the trustee, with rea-
sonable frequency, as to their investment choices.2 65 Thirdly, the plan
participants must be given a list of relevant information - sometimes
included in a mutual fund prospectus - and the right to request cer-
tain other information. 266
Ironically, one effect of the regulations has been to define more
clearly the safe harbor that employers may use to minimize further
fiduciary involvement in a plan. A well-crafted plan complying with
the regulations will go far toward insulating employers from further
responsibility for the success of the plan.267 The same undesired effect
tention that section 404(c) restricted amendment of plan); Connor v. MidSouth Ins. Agency, 943
F. Supp 647 (W.D. La. 1995) (holding the plan at issue did not come within section 404(c)).
260. See In re WorldCom, Inc., 263 F. Supp. 2d 745 (S.D.N.Y. 2003); In re Williams Co. ER-
ISA Litig., 271 F. Supp. 2d 1328 (N.D. Okla. 2003); In re Enron, 284 F. Supp. 2d. 511 (S.D. Tex.
2003); In re Syncor ERISA Litig., 351 F. Supp. 2d 970 (C.D. Cal. 2004); Rogers v. Baxter Intern.,
Inc., 417 F. Supp. 2d 974, 988-989 (N.D. Ill. 2006); Lively v. Dynegy. 420 F. Supp. 2d 949 (S.D. I11.
2006).
261. In re Schering-Plough Corp. ERISA Litig., 387 F. Supp. 2d 392 (D. N.J. 2004). The plan
provided that employees could not elect to invest more than 50 percent of their contributions to
an employer stock fund. Distinguishing the Enron decision, the court noted the Enron em-
ployee contributions were invested primarily in employer stock with employer matching contri-
butions. Id. at 400.
262. For an overview of the regulations, see Nell Hennessy & Frank Daniele, Participant-Di-
rected Retirement Plans under section 404(c), in ERISA FIDUCIARY LAW, supra note 117, at 175.
263. 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404c-1(b)(3)(i) (2007).
264. 57 Fed. Reg. 46, 906 (1992).
265. 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404c-1(b)(2 (2007).
266. 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404c-1(b)(2)(i)(B)(1) (2007).
267. See Stefanie Kastrinsky, ERISA Section 404(c) and Investment Advice: What is an Em-
ployer or Plan Sponsor to Do?, 80 CHI-KENT L. REv. 903, 915 (2005)
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of drawing boundaries to the corporate sponsor's fiduciary responsi-
bility has resulted from regulations defining investment advice.268 The
functional definition of a fiduciary in Section 3(21)(A) contains a sub-
division (ii) that imposes fiduciary responsibility on a person who
gives investment advice for compensation. 269 The Department of La-
bor has issued interpretative regulations of this provision270 and elab-
orated on the definition of investment advice in a 1996 revenue ruling
describing certain kinds of educational materials that would not trig-
ger fiduciary responsibility. 271 Though applying to investment advis-
ers, the regulatory guidelines draw a bright line defining where
fiduciary responsibility ends. The corporate sponsor, who has no af-
firmative duty to provide investment advice, 272 can avoid triggering
fiduciary responsibility by avoiding activity that comes within the pre-
cise guidelines defining investment advice.
Three systemic problems of 401(k) plans have a connection with the
existence of limited fiduciary responsibility under ERISA 404(c): the
erosion of benefits by fees and other costs, nafve and uninformed in-
vestment decisions, and the absence of financial planning in the distri-
bution of lump sum benefits. Because the primary purpose of
fiduciary rules is to serve retirement needs, we must examine these
systemic problems and possible remedies before addressing the effects
on corporate governance.
a. Fees and Other Expenses
Total annual costs of 401(k) plans charged to beneficiaries' accounts
amount, on average, to roughly 1.4 percent of plan assets, according to
two surveys of firms providing 401(k) plan services reported in a 1998
study of the Department of Labor.273 But the expenses vary widely
among plans; some charge as little as 0.6 percent and others over 2
268. See CERTIFIED FINANCIAL PLANNER BOARD OF STANDARDS, INC., EMPLOYEE RETIRE-
MENT INCOME SECURITY ACT (ERISA): AN EVALUATION AFTER 25 YEARS, at 4 (An Educa-
tional White Paper, 1999); Medill, supra note 252, at 69; Zanglein, supra note 252, at 262.
269. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A)(ii) (2007). See also definition of a fiduciary in IRC § 4975(e)(3)
and general discussion of the provision in BINES & THEL, supra note 16, at 744-745.
270. 29 C.F.R. § 2510.3-21 (2007).
271. 29 C.F.R. § 2509.96-1(d) (2007). The materials fall in four categories: plan information,
general financial and investment information, asset allocation models, and interactive invest-
ment programs to assist in financial planning.
272. See 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404c-1(c)(4) (2007) (" fiduciary has no obligation ... to provie
investment advice to a participant or beneficiary under an ERISA section 404(c) plan.") and 29
C.F.R. § 2509.96-1(b) n.1 (2007) (compliance with section 404(c) "does not require that partici-
pants and beneficiaries be offered or provided either investment advice or investment education
... to assist them in making investment decisions.")
273. DOL Fee Study, supra note 228, at § 4.3.
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percent-a variance by a factor of nearly four.274 The amount of fees
will materially affect ultimate retirement benefits of participants. Over
the course of an employee's career, an additional fee equal to 1 per-
cent of assets may result in a reduction of the employee's ending bal-
ance by 20 to 25 percent. 275 Critics claim that many plans absorb as
much as 1 percent of unnecessarily high fees and expenses,276 and the
claim is inherently plausible since a differential of 1 percent is fre-
quently encountered in the market place for 401(k) plan services.277
In managing fees and expenses, plan sponsors face an array of op-
tions, many of dizzying complexity and presenting difficult problems
of comparison. A study cited by the Department of Labor report
found that "78 percent of plan sponsors did not know how much their
costs were, largely because there are about 80 different ways in which
vendors charge fees. ' 278 Some fixed income funds and insurance
products do not disclose management fees.279 While the SEC does
require mutual funds to disclose management fees and expenses in the
fund prospectus and in annual reports to shareholders, 280 anyone dili-
gent enough to find the mandated disclosures will still need a high
level of technical knowledge and an ample allowance of time to ferret
out hidden costs and to estimate the actual impact of fee schedules on
a particular plan.281 Most plan sponsors retain a financial services
firm to provide all investment management services and specified ad-
ministrative tasks. These firms typically offer varying services and op-
tions, which all come at a cost that must be weighed against their
benefits.282
274. Id. at tbl. IV-6.
275. See id. at § I; MUNNEL & SUNDUN, supra note 218, at 78 (similar hypotheticals).
276. DOL Fee Study, supra note 228, at § 3.7.
277. Id. at tbls. IV-2, IV-3, IV-8, and § 5.3; Jeffrey M. Laderman, That 401(k) May Cost More
than You Think, Bus. WEEK, Nov.10, 1997, at 130 (full service providers charge fees as high as
2.87; the average is 1.29); Ellen E. Schultz & Vanessa O'Connel, A 401(k) Surprise: Fees Keep
Going Up and Up, WALL ST. J., Nov. 12, 1997, at Cl (investment fee .53 to 2.56; administrative
fees 0 to $75 per account); J.B. Quinn, Your 401k) Plan Could Be Robbing You, WASH. POST,
Jan. 11, 1998, at H2 (total cost often 2 or 3 percent).
278. DOL Fee Study, supra note 228, § 3.7. For a succinct description of the various catego-
ries of mutual fund fees, see Nell Hennessy, Follow the Money: ERISA Plan Investments in Mu-
tual Funds and Insurance, 38 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 867-874.
279. DOL Fee Study, supra note 228, § 2.4.2, 2.5.1, and 3.7.
280. See I.C. Release 26327, Shareholder Reports and Quarterly Portfolio Disclosures of Reg-
ulated Management Investment Companies, 69 Fed. Reg. 11243-11246 (Mar. 9, 2004). Supple-
ments earlier releases, see I.C. Release No 16244, 53 Fed. Reg. 3192 (Feb. 1, 1988) ; I.C. Release
no. 26195, 68 Fed. Reg. 57760 (Sep. 29, 2003).
281. See John P. Freeman & Steward L. Brown, Mutual Fund Advisory Fees: the Cost of Con-
flict of Interest, 26 J. CORP. L. 609, 662-667 (2004)
282. See Kastrinsky, supra note 267, at 916-921 (discussing investment advisory services).
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The bulk of 401(k) mutual fund investments are in retail funds
charging fees that have drawn criticism from financial experts.283 The
growth of mutual funds might be thought to introduce economies of
scale, 284 but in fact fees have crept upward in the past quarter century.
Estimates of fee increases, measured by the value of expenses to total
assets in a fund, cluster around an increase of 30 to 40 percent. 285 The
mutual fund market, it appears, has displayed a low level of cost com-
petition;286 most mutual fund purchasers do not understand fees and
do not trouble themselves about them.2 87 Freeman and Brown found
that the management fees paid by public pension funds as the result of
arm's-length negotiations are about a half the size of fees paid by the
purchasers of retail funds.288 Yet, 401(k) plan sponsors do have low-
cost options: one major family of funds touts its low fee schedules,
index fund fees are generally lower, and funds available only to insti-
tutional investors, such as pension funds charge fees that are about
half a percentage point lower than retail funds.289
Plan fiduciaries also face issues of dual loyalties in managing admin-
istrative costs of 401(k) plans (i.e. the costs of collecting money, keep-
ing records, making required filings, distributing money, and
providing information). 290 Many of these expenses may be charged
either to the corporation or to the account balances of plan benefi-
ciaries.291 The 1998 Department of Labor study found a strong trend
for corporate sponsors to pass on to the beneficiaries' administrative
expenses that were once almost universally borne by management.292
283. See DOL Fee Study, supra note 228, at § 2.4.1 (retail funds account for 80% of mutual
fund investments). For criticisms of retail mutual fund fees, see Andrea L. Prochniak, Does You
Fund cost Too Much?, FORTUNE, Dec. 25, 1995, at 145; Maggie Topkis, Getting Wise to Mutual
Fund Fees, FORTUNE, Dec. 23, 1996, at 191; Christopher Oster, Fees? You Mean Mutual Funds
have Fees?, WALL ST. J., July 14, 2000, at C1.
284. Freeman & Brown, supra note 281, at 619-627.
285. Freeman & Brown, supra note 281, at 620-621; DOL Fee Study, supra note 228, at § 3.4.3.
286. Id. at 655; D. K. Malhotra, An Empirical Analysis of Mutual Fund Expenses, 20 J. FIN.
RES. 175-176 (1997).
287. Oster, supra note 283.
288. Freeman & Brown, supra note 281, at 627-636.
289. The Vanguard family of funds seeks to appeal to price conscious investors. See Freeman
& Brown, supra note 281, at 618. For fees of index funds and institutional funds, see DOL Fee
Study, supra note 228, at §§ 2.4.1.3 and 4.2.1 and tbl. IV-3.
290. See Hennessy, supra note 278, at 875-878.
291. See DOL Fee Study, supra note 228, at § 3.4.1. A consideration of equity among benefi-
ciaries arises when costs may be assessed either as a percentage of assets or on a per capita basis,
shifting more of the burden to low-income employees. For a general discussion of administrative
costs, see PETER DIAMOND, ADMINISTRATIVE COSTS AND EQUILIBRIUM CHARGES WITH INDI-
VIDUAL AccouNTs (National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. Working Paper 7050, 1999)
292. DOL Fee Study, supra note 228, at §§ I and 5.3.2. Such administrative and non-invest-
ment management expenses typically account for between 25 and 10 percent of total plan costs.
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Plan participants have no control over the fees and expenses in the
menu of options offered by their plan sponsor and ordinarily have
little opportunity to engage in a cost comparison among these options.
The responsible management of expenses must come from corporate
executives who have the financial expertise to control plan expenses
and to introduce more price competition into the market for plan
services.293
b. Investment Decisions
"Choices are beneficial," the economist and psychologist George
Loewenstein remarks, "when people know what they are deciding
about and believe that their decisions are important. They can be
harmful, however, when people lack relevant information or exper-
tise. '294 While the opportunity for choice offered by 401(k) plans ap-
peals to some participants,295 other employees, who lack expertise or
interest in financial matters, make their investment decisions while
burdened by anxiety, fear of failure, and information overload.296 Ul-
timately, these employees tend to rely on one of several adaptive
strategies that most readers - if they are honest - will confess to hav-
ing used themselves in similar circumstances. There is the strategy of
DOL Fee Study, supra note 228, at § 3.6. See also Virginia Munger Kohn, When Hidden Fees
Erode 401(k)'s, N.Y. TIMES, July 22, 2001, at Bus. 8; Laderman, supra note 277; Schultz &
O'Connel, supra note 277.
293. See CERTIFIED FINANCIAL PLANNER BOARD OF STANDARDS, INC, supra note 268, at 3-4
("Before there were participant-directed plans, investment decisions were made by investment
committees. These committees consisted of corporate financial officers, portfolio managers, pro-
fessional analysts, and investment management consultants - all of whom typically had formal
education and experience in finance and investments. It was not at all uncommon to find CFOs,
CPAs, MBAs, CFAs, and others will similar backgrounds holding positions on the investment
committee. With the advent of participant direction, everyone from the receptionist to the re-
search chemist now is expected to be his or her own investment committee.").
294. George Loewenstein, Is More Choice Always Better?, at 1 (National Academy of Social
Insurance, Social Security Brief, 1999). See also Zanglein, supra note 252, at 246-255 (surveying
research showing the inadequate financial knowledge of 401(k) participants).
295. JAMES J. CHOI ET AL, PLAN DESIGN AND 401(K) SAVINGS OUTCOMES, 8, 15, (National
Bureau of Economic Research, Working paper 10486, 2004); Zanglein, supra note 252, at 248;
Medill, supra note 252, at 19 (A 1994 survey revealed that 62% of participants wanted to make
their own investment decisions, but the same survey found that only 26% of participants be-
lieved themselves to be well qualified to do so).
296. MUNNELL & SUNDEN, supra note 218, at 83 (large number of options offered in large
plans); JULIE AGNEW & LISA R. SZYKMAN, ASSET ALLOCATION AND INFORMATION OVERLOAD:
THE INFLUENCE OF INFORMATION DISPLAY, ASSET CHOICE AND INVESTOR EXPERIENCE (Center
for Retirement Research at Boston College, 2004) (finding that many investors lack even a basic
understanding of financial concepts; explores effects of information overload); Shlomo Benartzi
& Richard H. Thaler, How Much is Investor Autonomy Worth? 57 J. OF FIN., at 1593, 1598 (2002)




extremes avoidance; when faced with a spectrum of choices employ-
ees will choose the middle course.297 Alternatively, some employees
employ the 1/n strategy by dividing their investment in each option by
the number of choices. 298 Other strategies are calculated to minimize
the psychic cost of uninformed decision making. Some employees will
seek to minimize the likelihood of future regret by choosing conserva-
tive options that will not fail.299 Finally, there is the phenomenon of
"anchoring." Once having made a decision, employees are reluctant
to expend the time and effort to revisit it, even though circumstances
may change and the decision itself may have been based on more or
less arbitrary criteria.300
In light of such naive adaptive strategies in 401(k) investments, it is
not surprising to find recurring deficiencies in the investment patterns
in 401(k) accounts. The first casualty is the cardinal principle of diver-
sification. While plan sponsors are required to offer a core group of
diversified investment options,30 1 roughly half of 401(k) plan partici-
pants stray widely from the principle of diversification by concentrat-
ing excessively in fixed income investment, equity investments, 30 2 or
employer stock.30 3 It is particularly unfortunate that low-income em-
ployees figure prominently among those who opt for conservative
297. Benartzi & Thaler, supra note 296, at 1607-1611.
298. Shlomo Benartzi & Richard H. Thaler, NaiVe Diversification Strategies in Defined Contri-
bution Savings Plans, 91 AM. ECON. REV. 79-81, 87 (Mar. 2001)
299. Loewenstein, supra note 294, at 3.
300. Olivia S. Mitchell & Stephen P. Utkus, Lessons from Behavior Finance, in PENSION DE-
SIGN AND STRUCTURE 18 (Olivia S. Mitchell & Stephen P Utkus eds., 2004); Benartzi & Thaler,
supra note 296, at 1596; INVESTMENT COMPANY INSTITUTE, 401(K) PLAN PARTICIPANTS: CHAR-
ACTERISTICS, CONTRIBUTIONS, AND ACCOUNT ACTIVITY 6-7 (Spring 2000) (60% of plan partici-
pants in survey had not changed the allocation of their contributions at any time since joining the
plan).
301. See discussion infra Part II.F.3.
302. Sarah Holden & Jack VanDerhei, supra note 229, at figs.6, 7 (Investment Company Insti-
tute, August 2004); Julie Agnew et al., Portfolio Choice and Trading in a Large 401(k) Plan, 93
AM. ECON. REV. 193 (2003); MUNNEL & SUNDEN, supra note 218, at 80-81; Gordon P. Goodfel-
low & Sylvester J. Shreiber, Investment of Assets in Self-directed Retirement Plans, in POSITION-
INC PENSIONS FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY, at 77-80, tbls. 6-7 (Michael S. Gordon et al.
eds. 1997).
303. In plans that offer company stock as an option, this investment accounts for nearly 42
percent of plan assets. See Benartzi & Thaler, supra note 298, at 90, tbl. 5. This disproportionate
investment in company stock has been rightly criticized as an egregious departure from the prin-
ciple of diversification. See MUNNEL & SUNDEN, supra note 218, at 95-124. But the issue is
complicated. While a cap on employee investments in employer stock seems warranted, there
are reasonable arguments to allow some departure from diversification principles in this area.
Many employers match employee investments in company stock, thereby mitigating the invest-
ment risk; a low cap would curtail this source of plan contributions. Moreover, the employee
stock holdings in their employer's represent in theory an avenue for an employee voice in the
corporation, which could be encouraged by appropriate rules regarding voting and employee
communication. See 29 C.F.R. §§ 2550.404c-l(d)(2)(ii)(E)(4)(v) and (vi) (2007) See generally
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fixed income investments, such as money market funds and guaran-
teed investment contracts.304 They are the segment of the workforce
that most need to balance security and growth in their 401(k) invest-
ments. The consequences of inappropriate asset allocations are famil-
iar to those with specialized investment knowledge,30 5 but employees
seizing on simple rationales to resolve complex issues will inevitably
err with some frequency in choosing allocations suitable for their age
and financial circumstances. 306 There is evidence that the trauma of
decision making actually tend to discourage participation in 401(k)
plans30 7 and hence can be counted among the causes of the inade-
quate preparation for retirement affecting a broad segment of the
population.30 8
c. Distribution Decisions
Upon leaving a job covered by a 401(k) plan, employees must again
navigate a course through poorly mapped reefs and shoals.30 9
Younger employees seeking new employment may leave assets in the
existing 401(k) accounts, roll over the assets into an IRA or the 401(k)
of a new employer, or take the account balance in a cash payment or
series of payments. Most employees with small balances take and
spend the cash balance, treating it as a kind of small windfall.310 Em-
ployers can in any event compel cash distributions from small ac-
Jack L. VanDerhei, The Role of Company Stock in 401(k) Plans, 5 RISK MGMT & INS. REV., No.
1 (2002)
304. MUNNELL & SUNDEN, supra note 218, at 81-82; AGNEW & SZYKMAN, supra note 296, at
24.
305. Michael J. Brennan & Walter N. Torous, Individual Decision-Making and Investor Wel-
fare, 28 ECON. NOTES, No. 2, 119-143 (July 1999) (calculating that the opportunity cost of invest-
ing half the optimal amount in equities for 20 years is comparable to having a portfolio
management fee of 1 and a half percent per year); Dave Veeneman & Elizabeth McWhirter,
Implementing Effective Asset Allocation, in WHEN WORKERS CALL THE SHOTS: CAN THEY
ACHIEVE RETIREMENT SECURITY? (Dallas L. Salisbury ed.,1995).
306. Benartzi & Thaler, supra note 298, at 96.
307. Sheena Sethi-Iyengar et al., How Much Choice is Too Much? Contributions to 401(k)
Retirement Plans, in PENSION DESIGN & STRUCTURE, supra note 300, at 88-92; MUNNELL &
SUNDEN, supra note 218, at 71-73.
308. CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, BABY BOOMERS' RETIREMENT PROSPECTS: AN OVER-
VIEW 2 (Nov. 2003); Annemaria Lusardi, Saving and the Effectiveness of Financial Education, in
PENSION DESIGN & STRUCTURE, supra note 300, at 157-159; Mark J. Warshowski & John Amer-
iks, How Prepared are Americans for Retirement?, in FORECASTING RETIREMENT NEEDS AND
RETIREMENT WEALTH (Olivia Mitchell et al. eds., 2000) ("A majority of American households
are predicted to fall short in funding retirement"). For a discussion of gender and ethnic dispari-
ties, see Zanglein, supra note 252, at 232-244.
309. See Susan J. Stabile, The Behavior of Defined Contribution Plan participants, 77 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 71, 95-98 (2002).
310. Mike McCarthy & Liz McWhirter, Are Employees Missing the Big Picture?, BENEFITS Q.,
at 27 (First Quarter 2000).
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counts of $5,000 or less.311 The percentage taking cash distributions
declines slowly as the size of the account rises. Thirty one percent of
employees with accounts between $25-50,000 request cash distribu-
tions but only 6 percent of those with accounts above $100,000.312 The
option of rolling over assets into an IRA has risen in popularity, but
no more than 6 percent of employees exercise option of transferring
their account balances to the 401(k) of a new employer, though it is
often worthy of serious consideration. 313 The new employer's 401(k)
plan may have lower costs or offer the option of a group annuity.
Investment decisions on retirement will vitally affect employees' fi-
nancial future. The most recent statistics drawn from the period of
1992-2000 reveal that only 7.5 percent of retiring employees covered
by a 401(k) plan applied their account balance to purchase a annuity
offering lifetime income; 78 percent chose some form of installment
payment of benefits or rollover to an IRA (which must later be dis-
tributed in cash by age 70 1/2) and about 15 percent requested a lump
sum cash distribution at the time of retirement. 314 The foregone op-
tion of an annuity providing lifetime income has fateful consequences
for the employee and society. Studies show that happiness during re-
tirement is positively correlated with an assured lifetime income, that
is, an annuity.315 When employees take a lump sum or installment
distribution, a significant fraction will outlive their retirement assets,
causing distress in their own lives and a probable cost to society. 316
Why do employees retiring from 401(k) plans neglect the option of
an annuity? The most obvious explanation is that about one third of
401(k) plans traditionally offered employees only the option of partic-
ipating in a group annuity and individual annuities are notoriously
more expensive.317 But employees also find the choice of an annuity
to involve difficult trade-offs. By using an account balance to
311. I.R.S. Reg. 1.411(a)-11(c)(3)(ii).
312. McCarthy & McWhirter, supra note 310, at 27.
313. Id. at 26. The figure of 6 percent is from 1998 but it had remained flat in previous years.
314. See GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PRIVATE PENSIONS: PARTICIPANTS NEED INFORMA-
TION ON RISKS THEY FACE IN MANAGING PENSION ASSETS AT AND DURING RETIREMENT,
GAO-03-810, at 43, tbl. 2 (July 2003). For mandatory IRA distribution, see I.R.C. § 401(a)(9)
(2007).
315. Constantyn W. A. Panis, Annuities and Retirement Well-Being, in PENSION DESIGN &
STRUCTURE, supra note 300, at 259-274.
316. For a discussion of social harm of inadequate retirement planning, see Stabile, supra note
222, at 394-396.
317. The GAO study found that 38 percent of defined contribution plans had an annuity op-
tion, but it notes that a separate study of the Profit Sharing Council of America found only 28
percent had this option. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 314, at 11, 14. With regard
to individual annuity costs, see DIAMOND, supra note 291, at 13 (1999).
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purchase an annuity, employees give up irrevocably things of certain
value - the immediate enjoyment of accumulated wealth and prospect
of a legacy to children - and in exchange they get a flow of income
with a value based on arcane technical calculations and uncertain ex-
pectations of mortality. Faced with such a tradeoff, employees tend to
undervalue annuities or to procrastinate. TIAA-CREF, a defined con-
tribution plan, traditionally only offered employees the option of con-
verting their ending balance into an annuity, but in the 1990s it
introduced three other choices: the possibility of deferring payment
while receiving income, an installment payout, and a lump sum pay-
out. In 2001, 45 percent of retiring employees chose an annuity, 17
percent chose deferred distribution and 38 percent took a cash pay-
out.318 The statistics provide a kind of percentage benchmark of em-
ployees that (wisely or unwisely) will choose an annuity if they are
given sound advice and a financially attractive group annuity. The
fact that only 7.5 percent of employees retiring from 401(k) plans
make this choice can be explained only by poor financial guidance and
the unavailability of employer-sponsored group annuities.
3. Fiduciary Responsibility
These problem areas of 401(k) plans are each rooted in the limited
and diffuse fiduciary structure of employee-directed plans. Like other
pension plans, 401(k) plans demand continuous supervision: costs
must be monitored, investment options reviewed, educational pro-
grams scheduled, and counseling services tailored to meet employee
needs. The experience of 401(k) plans shows that they cannot run on
a kind of auto-pilot, driven by employee choices, without active in-
volvement of a plan fiduciary. In other words, responsible plan ad-
ministration cannot be achieved without assigning responsibility for
the effective administration of the plan.
In the past 15 years, there have been repeated efforts to improve
401(k) plans without addressing the underlying fiduciary structure
provided by ERISA Section 404(c). It must be immediately conceded
that these reform efforts have often been constructive and that other
non-fiduciary reforms might be helpful. The SEC rules regulating the
disclosure of mutual fund costs have prepared the ground for more
effective cost monitoring. 319 The Department of Labor interpretative
bulletin 96-1 creates ground rules for educational seminars, which
318. Loewenstein, supra note 294, at 5-6.
319. See discussion infra Part II.F.3.a.
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have proven valuable, 320 and authorizes interactive computer educa-
tion that responds to the needs of some employees. 321 The Pension
Protection Act of 2006 now allows financial services firms to engage in
investment education and counseling within a safe harbor from pro-
hibited transaction rules;322 it may encourage the already expanding
market for such services, though problems of costs and conflict of in-
terest remain. 323 The need for counseling on termination and retire-
ment has been sadly neglected, but the recent GAO study discusses
the possibility of improved employee notices and mandated group
annuities.324
Nevertheless, reforms will fall short of their potential unless admin-
istered by a responsible fiduciary body. We may consider as an exam-
ple the well conceived provision of the Pension Protection Act of 2006
removing barriers to automatic enrollment of employees in 401(k)
plans. 325 Plan provisions for automatic enrollment have proven an ef-
fective means of increasing participation by placing the burden on em-
ployees to opt out of the plan, but they must provide default options
for individual investment accounts if an employee fails to exercise
choice. 326 Employers are exposed to liability for their default option
choice and ordinarily take the safe course of stipulating a conservative
investment, such as money market funds. For their part, employees
are prone to accepting the default options without exercising the
choice permitted in a 404(c) plan. Thus, automatic enrollment unfor-
tunately tends to cause a shift in employee investment away from ap-
320. Lusardi, supra note 308, at 157, 171; David D. McCarthy & John A. Turner, Pension
Education: Does it Work? Does it Matter?, BENEFITS Q., at 64 (First Quarter 2000).
321. Zanglein, supra note 252, at 259.
322. Section 601 of the Act adds a new subdivision 14 to ERISA § 408(b), which provides an
exemption from the prohibited transaction rules from an "eligible investment advice arrange-
ment," designed to reduce conflict of interest problems. Either the arrangement must provide
that the fee received by the investment adviser will not vary depending on the investment option
selected for the plan beneficiaries or it must employ a computer model, relying on objective
criteria, that complies with detailed statutory specifications. See JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXA-
TION, TECHNICAL EXPLANATION OF THE PENSION PROTECTION ACT OF 2006, at 127-132. The
Act and the Technical Explanation are available at the website of the Profit Sharing/401(k)
Council of America. See www.psca.org.
323. See Kastrinsky, supra note 267, at 916-921; John Hechinger, Hiring a Pro to Pick Your
Funds: Professional Management is Latest Option in Some 401(k) Plans, but Fees Can Be Steep,
WALL ST. J., at D1 (Oct. 21, 2003); Medill, supra note 252, at 52-62, 71-72 (discussing conflict of
interest issues).
324. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 314, at 22-29, 52-59.
325. Section 902 of the Pension Protection Act of 2006 adds a new section 401(k)(13) provid-
ing that an employer who adopts a "qualified automatic enrollment feature" will be regarded as
complying with the nondiscrimination rules and the top heavy rule.
326. Rev.Rul. 98-30, 1998-1 C.B. 1273; Rev. Rul 2000-8, 2000-1 C.B. 617.
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propriate standards of diversification and asset allocation. 327 To
achieve its potential, it must be combined with a judicious selection of
investment options and active programs to educate and advise benefi-
ciaries regarding suitable investment choices.
The most direct way to promote fiduciary responsibility is to impose
such responsibility on a well identified group of administrators with
the capacity to discharge their assigned duties. In large 401(k) plans,
such a fiduciary body is likely to bear a strong resemblance to the
boards of pension trustees required by the British Pension Act 1995.
An effective fiduciary body must enlist the expertise of executives
who are most likely to have the qualifications to monitor costs and
investment strategies, but the presence of employee representatives -
one third of the board in the British plan - is essential for successful
plan administrations. The employee representatives, if properly cho-
sen, can check conflicts of interest while providing needed input in the
selection of investments and services. Their presence is particularly
important in a 401(k) plan because of the need to present employees
with appropriate options and services to guide their retirement plan-
ning. 328 The plan fiduciaries must understand employees' needs and
preferences. If they do not include employee representatives in their
deliberations, the plan fiduciaries will labor under a handicap and may
not fully grasp employees' needs.
4. Corporate Governance
Our analysis of 401(k) plans again reveals a form of management
domination of pension fund participation in corporate governance.
The power of management to select mutual fund investments in
401(k) plans creates a systemic pressure on the funds that tends to
generate passive acceptance of management positions in proxy voting.
An independent board of trustees on the British model can be ex-
pected also to loosen conflicts of interest and to inject a new element
into the demand part of the equation - the preferences of employee
representatives drawn from outside the circle of management.
327. Brigitte C. Madrian & Dennis F. Shea, The Power of Suggestion: Inertia in 401(k) Partici-
pation and Savings Behavior, 116 Q. J. ECON., no. 4, 1149-187 (2001) (analyzing a large 401(k)
plan before and after adoption of an automatic enrollment provision); Lowenstein, supra note
294, at 4-5; AGNEW & SZYKMAN, supra note 296, at 6.
328. The expectations of participants are a key factor in creating an effective program of fi-
nancial education and advice. See Richard D. Glass, Investment Education or Advice? That's the
Wrong Question to Ask, EMP. BENEFITS J., at 19 (June 2000). On the relationship between plan
design and participant choice, see Mitchell & Utkus, in PENSION DESIGN & STRUCTURE, supra
note 300, at 16-17, 31-34; AGNEW & SZYKMAN, supra note 296, at 13-15, 22.
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The conflict of interest problems most affecting corporate govern-
ance are derived from the business relationships between mutual
funds and management. An independent board of trustees, with ben-
eficiary representatives, would insulate pension administration, to
some degree, from management. Mutual funds would then do busi-
ness with a clientele consisting of pension boards separated from man-
agement by clearly defined fiduciary accountability and the presence
of a beneficiary representative. To the extent that their clientele
would enjoy independence, the mutual funds themselves would be
more free to exercise independent judgment in the proxy voting of
corporate equities in pension funds.
The practical importance of this conflict of interest factor is admit-
tedly uncertain since the proxy voting of mutual funds is subject to
complex and concurrent explanations. The preference of most institu-
tional investors for active trading and administrative inertia both work
strongly in the favor of management. 329 Shareholder activism requires
an investment of staff time that is more easily justified with a long
investment horizon. In addition, the investment managers overseeing
the proxy voting process are tied to management by training and a
common business culture. But the proxy voting of mutual funds still
exhibits considerable variability; some pension managers do vote
against management on some issues. The mitigation of conflict of in-
terest can be expected to increase this variability, though the precise
impact is impossible to predict.
Fiduciary reform of 401(k) plans could also change the demand fac-
tor affecting proxy voting by mutual funds. Management influence
over such proxy voting serves to constrain the preference of constitu-
encies in American society, outside the circle of management, that are
concerned about corporate conduct. The participation of benefi-
ciaries in the governing boards of 401(k) plans, while intended to as-
sist the administration of retirement benefits, would also change the
composition of the boards from the marketing perspective of mutual
fund managers. The so-called socially responsible mutual funds,
which are today almost shut out of the 401(k) market, would find a
different, and possibly more receptive, market in boards of trustees
with a new social composition.330 Other mutual fund managers, con-
cerned about their image of corporate responsibility, might find a new
incentive to claim a responsible proxy voting record and to vote in a
329. Coffee, supra note 9, at 1318-1335.
330. Personal communication with John C. Harrington, principal Harrington Investment, Inc.
(Nov.17, 2006) (describing the difficulty of selling to corporate customers 401(k) plans that vote
against management positions).
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manner supporting such a claim. It is noteworthy that the huge Van-
guard family of funds took certain tentative steps following the 2003
proxy disclosure rule to appeal to the post-Enron backlash of popular
sentiment.331 In short, the marketing of pension funds to independent
pension boards, with beneficiary members, would create sales oppor-
tunities for mutual funds seeking to align their proxy voting record
more closely to the values and expectations of segments of American
public outside the circle of management.
As a practical matter, the proxy voting policies of mutual funds can
be modified only by freeing a market demand for change. No one
doubts that mutual funds are sensitive to all sectors of the market, but
the internal governance of the funds is notoriously unresponsive to
the investing public. With a few exceptions, mutual funds are oper-
ated by investment advisors that control all aspects of the funds' life,
including investment decisions, marketing, and administrative ser-
vices.332 The funds have recourse to their own corporate governance
procedures only on an ad hoc basis as required by the Investment
Company Act of 1940.333 As an SEC release states, the investment
advisers typically dominated the funds they advise as a result of "ex-
tensive involvement" in fund management and "the general absence
of shareholder activism. '334
One cannot predict with any confidence what effect the fiduciary
reform of 401(k) plans would have on the corporate governance activ-
ities of mutual funds marketed to the 401(k) industry. The effect
might be quite modest. On the other hand, it might gain significance
in combination with other reforms suggested in this article. It is not
implausible to suppose that mutual funds linked to the 401(k) market
would more often join in coalitions of investors engaged in the active
pursuit of corporate responsibility and that the herd behavior, now
331. In 2002, Vanguard voted in favor of the full slate of directors nominated to serve on the
board of directors in 90 percent of the contests in which they voted; in 2003, they voted in favor
of the full slate in 20 percent of the contests. In 2002, it voted for all auditor approvals; in 2003,
it voted for 79 percent of the approvals. In the latter year, it also voted to approve only 36% of
employer stock option plans. See Ken Brown, Vanguard Gives Corporate Chiefs a Report Card,
WALL ST. J., Nov. 10, 2003, at C1, cited in GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 314, at 19.
332. For a good introduction to mutual fund organization, see Schonfeld & Kerwin, supra note
223. The Investment Company Act of 1940 is codified as 15 U.S.C. § 80a-1 through 80a-64
(2007).
333. Schonfeld & Kerwin, supra note 223, at 122-125; 3 TAMAR FRANKEL & ANN TAYLOR
SCHWING, THE REGULATION OF MONEY MANAGERS, MUTUAL FUNDS AND ADVISORS § 21.17,
at 21.149 (2006 Supp.); Freeman & Brown, supra note 281, at 614-616.
334. See Role of Independent Directors of Investment Companies, Sec. Act Release No. 33-
7754, [1999-2000 Trans. Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 86,212, at 82,451 (Oct 14, 1999).
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apparent on the issue of classified boards, would spread to more
issues.335
The speculative nature of these scenarios is not a reason to maintain
the status quo. A reformed 401(k) fiduciary structure is dictated inde-
pendently by the beneficiaries' interest in improved administration of
retirement benefits. The benign effects on corporate governance are
an additional consideration favoring reform. Though generally ne-
glected in studies of 401(k) plans, the system-wide effects of the fidu-
ciary structure on effective corporate monitoring is a factor that bears
on the important question whether the power of mutual funds can be
brought to serve the goal of corporate self-regulation.
III. CORPORATE SELF-REGULATION
My analysis thus far, if it has been persuasive, makes its own case
for reform. I first noted the benefits of construing the statutory re-
quirement of diversification in light of modern portfolio theory and a
duty to monitor. In other sections, I have traced regulatory and legal
anomalies lacking any legal or policy justification. Falling within this
category are the discussions of overly broad securities regulations, the
strange case of the Federal Savings Plan, and the restrictive impact of
the Taft-Hartley Act. The most important issues have concerned the
defective fiduciary structures imposed by ERISA on both employer-
directed plans and 401(k) plans. The British Pension Act 1995 offers a
compelling model for an independent board of trustees. This board
would not only assure sound benefit administration but would also
positively impact corporate monitoring by pension plans.
The reforms advocated here aim to partially restore to pension
funds an influence proportionate to their share ownership by remov-
ing offensive obstacles and burdens. But it may be asked: what is the
urgency of pursuing more effective corporate monitoring as a policy
objective? The question is particularly acute when reforms can be ex-
pected to make no more than incremental improvements in a weak
existing system of monitoring. The answer depends on whether the
modest reforms advocated in this article can form part of a broader
strategy for achieving a higher level of corporate self-regulation.
Before discussing the prospects of such a strategy, I will turn to the
theory of corporate self-regulation and the value of a pension plan
voice in corporate governance.
335. For a critical view of potential herd behavior of mutual funds, see Palmiter, supra note
225, at 1485-1486.
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A. The Theory of Self-Regulation
While economic theories have dominated legal scholarship on cor-
porate governance, 336 the scholarly literature of business administra-
tion has pursued a tradition of scientific management that borrows at
times from allied fields of the life sciences. 337 In recent decades, early
twentieth century engineering methodologies have been comple-
mented by concepts of organizational learning, renewal, and self-regu-
lation that mirror in certain respects the architecture of life.338 At the
same time, network organizations that radically depart from old hier-
archical models, such as Visa International, 339 W. L. Gore and Associ-
ates,340  and the Mondragon cooperatives, 341  have achieved
recognition and business success. By positing new ways of structuring
an enterprise, this new brew of management theories and practice
calls into question the corporate forms that calcified early in the past
century and inevitably blurs the distinction between studies of corpo-
336. The theories of Coase continue to hold interest for corporate governance scholars and
have been described as "the 'dominant legal academic view."' William T. Allen, Contracts and
Communities in Corporate Law, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1395, 1400 (1993); Stephen M. Bain-
bridge, The Case for Limited Shareholder Voting Rights, 53 UCLA L. REV. 601; Thomas S. Ulen,
The Coasean Firm in Law and Economics, 18 J. CORP. L. 301 (1993); Frank H. Easterbrook &
Daniel R. Fischell, The Corporate Contract, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1416 (1989). See RONALD H.
COASE, THE NATURE OF THE FIRM (1937) reprinted in R. H. COASE, THE FIRM, THE MARKET,
AND THE LAW 33 (1988). An extensive literature exists on the "agency problem," i.e. the ten-
dency of corporate management make a different assessment of corporate interests than share-
holders would choose. See, e.g., Iman Anabtawi, Some Skepticism about Increasing Shareholder
Power, 53 UCLA L. REV 561, 565 n.11 (2006) (collecting sources); Lynne L. Dallas, The Rela-
tional Board: Three Theories of Corporate Boards of Directors, 22 J. CORP. L. 1 (1996).
337. See e.g. STAFFORD BEER, BRAIN OF THE FIRM (1972); John Matthews, Holonic Organiza-
tional Architectures, 15 HUMAN SYS. MGMT 27 (1996); ARIE DE GEUS, THE LIVING COMPANY
(1997); MARGARET J. WHEATLEY, LEADERSHIP AND THE NEW SCIENCE (3d ed. 2006).
338. Milan Zeleny, Amoeba: The New Generation of Self-Managing Human Systems, 9
HUMAN SYS. MGMT. 57-59 (1990); Ikijiro Nonaka, Creating Organizational Order Out of Chaos:
Self-Renewal in Japanese Firms, 30 CAL. MGMT. REV. 57 (1988); Bo Hedberg, How Organiza-
tions Learn and Unlearn, in 1 HANDBOOK OF ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGN 3-27 (Paul Nystrom &
William Starbuck eds., 1981); Shann Turnbull, Stakeholder Governance: A Cybernetic and Prop-
erty Rights Analysis, in CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, at 401, 406-411 (R. I. Tricker ed., 2000).
339. See DEE HOCK, BIRTH OF THE CHAORDIC AGE (2000). Hock is the founder and former
CEO of Visa International.
340. See ROBERT LEVERING & MILTON MOSKOWITz, THE 100 BEST COMPANIES TO WORK
FOR IN AMERICA 151-156 (1993).; Michael Weinreb, Power to the People, SALES & MARKETING
MGTr., Apr. 2003, at 30-35.
341. See GEORGE CHENEY, VALUES AT WORK, EMPLOYEE PARTICIPATION MEETS MARKET
PRESSURE AT MONDRAGON 35-65 (1999) (providing a succinct history of the development of the
cooperative complex); WILLIAM FOOTE WHYTE & KATHLEEN KING WHYTE, MAKING MON-
DRAGON: THE GROWTH AND DYNAMICS OF THE WORKER COOPERATIVE COMPLEX (1988).
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rate management and corporate governance - a new mode of busi-
ness organization will affect both spheres. 342
The narrow focus of this essay calls for only a limited excursion into
this field of management science. I will confine myself to two obser-
vations. First, self-regulation in its most elementary form necessarily
entails a separation of power between interdependent components of
the organization. 343 The point might seem unduly obvious if it did not
run counter to the still entrenched hierarchical modes of organization.
As Shann Turnbull remarks, the implication of this principle is only
that management cannot set its own exams or grade its own examina-
tion papers.344 The self-regulating organization will instead have
mechanisms for receiving negative feedback and processing it to gen-
erate corrective adjustments. For its part, management will be ac-
countable for its performance to a control center or centers capable of
holding it to a desired standard. This separation of power inherent in
any degree of self-regulation may be simple or complex and may de-
pend on assigned responsibilities within the organization or a distribu-
tion of power to corporate stakeholders.
We are concerned here with a simple separation of power based on
one important stakeholder, the shareholders. The weakness of the
present system of self-regulation can be partially traced to the lack of
a shareholder constituency with the capacity to carry out effective
monitoring. The potential for self-regulation would be enhanced to
the extent that this deficiency is remedied. It may be true that a
shareholder base, possessing effective power within a system of corpo-
rate governance, would not assure the success of a shareholder-based
system of self-regulation - the design of the system is critical - but it
would still create a potential for self-regulation lacking today.
There is a point of intersection between this aspect of the theory of
self-regulation and the republican principle of separation of powers.
342. Philip B. Evans & Thomas S. Wurster, Strategy & The New Economics of Information,
HARV. Bus. REV., Sept.-Oct. 1997, at 71 (stating information technology favors modular organi-
zation); David W. Cravens et al., New Organizational Forms for Competing in Highly Dynamic
Environments: the Network Paradigm, 7 BRIT. J. MGMT. 203-218 (1996); Charles Handy, Balanc-
ing Corporate Power: a New Federalist Paper, HARV. Bus. REV., Nov.-Dec. 1992, at 59; Ricardo
Semler, Managing Without Managers, 89 HARV. Bus. REV., Sept.-Oct. 1989, at 76 (describing a
radical departure from hierarchical organization similar to W. L. Gore and Associates); PATRI-
CIA MCLAGAN & CHRIsTO NEL, THE AGE OF PARTICIPATION (1995).
343. Shann Turnbull, Charters with Competitive Advantages, 74 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 89, 144
(2000); Shann Turnbull, Self-Regulation 2-4, 8-10 (July 6, 1997), at SSRN: ssrn.com/abstract=
630041; Corporate Governance: Its Scope Concerns and Theories, in CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
415, 431 (R. I. Tricker ed., 2000).
344. SHANN TURNBULL, A NEW WAY TO GOVERN 8 (New Economics Foundation, London,
Working paper No. 5, 2002).
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Both favor dismantling hierarchical concentrations of power. In a
brilliant essay, John Braithwaite presents a closely related idea: a sep-
aration of power in the corporation facilitates the task of checking
abuse of power. 345 Empirical research shows that the tactic of check-
ing abuse of power with countervailing power often fails for a number
of reasons. Among others, the more powerful the offending actor the
greater is likely to be its ability to deploy effective countermeasures so
as to neutralize attempted regulation. The most effective strategy to
check abuse of power is commonly to enlist the cooperation of gate-
keepers and enablers within the organization who do not benefit from
the abuse of power but are able to control it. Herein lies the impor-
tance of internal separation of power. "[T]o the extent that we have
richer, more plural separation of power" in a corporation the greater
will be the number of third parties, with power to check abuses, whose
cooperation can be secured through soft sanctions and dialogue. 346
Braithwaite lists nine ways of separating private power in a business
enterprise. The first is relevant to our inquiry: "better securing the
separation of the three major branches of corporate governance -
shareholders, directors, and managers. '347 His argument against hier-
archical concentrations of power parallels the theory of self-regula-
tion.348 In either case, an internal separation of power in the
corporation has the potential of reducing the burden of regulatory en-
forcement, either by rendering it unnecessary or by increasing the ef-
fectiveness of soft sanctions and dialogue.
Secondly, self-regulation depends on a sufficient variety of informa-
tion being available to control centers in the corporation. On this
point, I rely on Stafford Beer, who is known for applying the insights
of cybernetics to management science. In the science of cybernetics,
variety is the measure of complexity; it represents "the number of pos-
sible states of whatever it is whose complexity we want to mea-
345. John Braithwaite, On Speaking Softly and Carrying Big Sticks: Neglected Dimensions of a
Republic Separation of Powers, 47 U. TORONTO L. J. 305 (1997).
346. Id. at 340.
347. Id. at 353.
348. The Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002 presupposes a hierarchical command-and-control struc-
ture of the corporation by directing the weight of civil and criminal liability against top officers
and directors. See Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat 745 (2002), e.g. § 302, 15 U.S.C. § 7241 (2007);
§ 304, 15 U.S.C. § 7243 (2007); § 802, 18 U.S.C. § 1519 (2007); § 906, 18 U.S.C. § 1350 (2007);
§ 904, 29 U.S.C. § 1131 (2007); § 1106, 15 U.S.C. § 78ff(a) (2007). This concentration of sanctions
on top management seems likely to have a centripetal influence on corporate organization and
to reinforce a hierarchical corporate structure, thereby undermining the principles of self-regula-
tion and a republican separation of power.
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sure. '349 A fundamental principle, known as Ashby's law, is that only
variety can absorb variety. This means that "the regulator has to be
capable of generating a variety equivalent to the variety that has to be
regulated - or the regulator will fail."'350 A control center can func-
tion consistently only if it receives feedback information from a suffi-
cient variety of sources to match the complexity of situations to which
it is expected to respond. According to Beer, the law of requisite vari-
ety stands in "the same relation to management as the law of gravity
stands to Newtonian physics. '351
The value placed on the variety of information in the science of self-
regulation can sometimes run counter to a simple logic founded in
common experience. This logic may be expressed in the phrase: "give
the best guy the job" and it is vividly captured by a comment from
Charles Wohlstetter, the former CEO of Contel. Inveighing against
public pension funds, he complains, "In sum, we have a group of peo-
ple with increasing control of the Fortune 500 who have no proven
skills in management, no experience in selecting directors, no believa-
ble judgment in how much should be spent for research or marketing
- in fact, no experience except that which they have accumulated con-
trolling other people's money. ' 352 One may easily concede that Wohl-
stetter may be right in insisting that managers as a class are far better
qualified to direct a corporation than institutional investors. But he
does not take into account that a variety of channels of information is
necessary to respond to the complexity of the world. An organization
that suppresses variety in decision-making by excluding a valuable
source of information will inevitably overlook opportunities and gen-
erate dysfunctions. Yes, the best qualified person should get the job -
and it may not be an institutional investor - but within a corporate
structure which assures that information beyond the manager's own
area of competence is received and processed. The point is not that
institutional investors make good managers but that they can add to
the variety of feedback channels available to control centers in the
corporation.
349. STAFFORD BEER, THE HEART OF THE ENTERPRISE: THE MANAGERIAL CYBERNETICS OF
ORGANIZATION 32 (1979).
350. Id. at 89.
351. Ibid; see also STAFFORD BEER, DECISION AND CONTROL 247, 272-344 (1966); Shann
Turnbull, supra note 338, at 401, 408; HIROTAKA TAKEUCHI & IKUJIRO NONAKA, THE KNOWL-
EDGE-CREATING COMPANY 82-83 (1995).
352. Charles Wohistetter, The Fight for Good Governance, HARV. Bus. REV., Jan-Feb, 1993,
at 78.
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B. A Pension Fund Voice
The literature on corporate governance identifies five benefits of a
pension fund voice in the corporate decision-making process, both to
the corporation itself and to society at large. It is necessary to qualify
the empirical basis for each of these benefits: they apply to some pen-
sion funds but not others, or apply to many funds to some extent, or
merely represent a plausible future role of the funds. Nevertheless, I
suggest that there is enough residual validity in the proposed benefits
to show that a pension fund voice could usefully enhance the variety
of information available for corporate decision-making.
1. Long Term View
Fifteen years ago there was little dissent from the assumption that
an excessively short-term investment horizon of United States busi-
ness was the source of many economic ills. The phenomenon was
linked to the increased prominence of institutional investors in the
market. By focusing on quarterly returns, institutional investors were
seen as pressuring management to adopt short-term expedients and to
scrimp on research and development and needed capital projects.353
Unions raised the additional concern that the "short-termism" was the
cause of job loss caused by mergers and leveraged buyouts. 354 More
recent research has cast doubt on the importance of this factor, at
least as a primary diagnosis of economic ills, but few would question
that business planning should be shielded from an undue emphasis on
quarterly returns.355
Pension funds are dedicated to the long-term by their commitment
to provide retirement benefits. On average, 30 years elapses between
contributions and payouts,356 but the actual administration of the
plans reveals many variables in investment strategies. Mutual funds in
401(k) plans are part of a larger market of funds that are often charac-
terized by rapid turnover of investments. The money-managers em-
ployed by employer-sponsored plans are under competitive pressures
to produce quarterly results; large public plans commonly retain a
number of external investment managers who must continually
353. MICHAEL T. JACOBS, SHORT-TERM AMERICA, THE CAUSES AND CURES OF OUR Busi-
NESS MYOPIA 7-24 (1991); O'BARR & CONLEY, supra note 36, at 160-161; ROE, supra note 7, at
240.
354. Dean Baker & Archon Fung, Collateral Damage: Do Pension Fund Investments Hurt
Workers?, in WORKING CAPITAL, supra note 123, at 13, 17-22.
355. CAROLYN KAY BRANCATO, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
28-33 (1997). But see Ownership Matters, ECONOMIST, Mar. 11, 2006, at 10; Constance Bagley &
Karen Page, The Devil Made Me Do It, 36 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 897, 921 (1999).
356. MONKS & MINow, supra note 111, at 143.
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demonstrate the value of their services.357 Still, although good statisti-
cal comparisons are hard to find, there is no doubt that the portfolios
of pension funds tend to display lower annual turnovers than other
categories of institutional investors. 358
2. Systematic View
In an influential 1992 article, Bernard Black presented empirical ev-
idence of a series of "systemic shortfalls in corporate performance"
that arise when the private interests of corporate executives impinge
on the interests of shareholders.359 The evidence of these systemic
shortfalls has continued to accumulate. 360 In general they fall into
three categories: (1) empire building through ill-conceived acquisi-
tions and diversification, (2) excessive retention of cash, (3) and un-
reasonably high executive compensation. 361
Without effective monitoring, executives can hardly be expected to
exercise restraint in matters affecting their own compensation. Simi-
lar conflicts of interest frequently color the issues of cash retention
and empire building. Lucien Bebchuk observes, "Having a larger em-
pire serves management's private interests. Management can derive
greater private benefits, in both pecuniary and non-pecuniary terms,
from running a large firm. In addition, retaining undistributed liquid
funds ('free cash flow') or assets that can be turned into such funds
increases the autonomy of management vis-a-vis the capital markets
and bolsters its freedom to pursue expansion plans. Indeed, some
scholars have viewed these concerns as the most significant agency
problems that large public companies face. ' 362
Both Black and Bebchuk argue for an increased role of institutional
investors to monitor corporate planning for signs of executive self-
357. Coffee, supra note 9, at 1325-1326.
358. Useem, supra note 83, at 32; Brancato, supra note 355, at 27; HAWLEY & WILLIAMS,
supra note 106, at 7.
359. Bernard Black, The Value of Institutional Investor Monitoring: The Empirical Evidence,
39 UCLA L. REV. 895, 898 (1992).
360. See sources cited in Lucien A. Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power, 118
HARV. L. REV. 833, 903-904 (2005).
361. See also Michael B. Dorff, Softening Pharaoh's Heart: Harnassing Altruistic Theory and
Behavioral Law & Economics to Rein in Executive Salaries, 51 BUFFALO L. REV. 811, 824-829
(2003); Randall S. Thomas, Should Directors Reduce Executive's Pay?, 54 HASTINGS L. J. 437,
440-442, 453-458 (2003); Lucian A. Bebchuk et al., Managerial Power and Rent Extraction in the
Design of Executive Compensation, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 754, 783-795 (2002); Kevin J. Murphy,
Explaining Executive Compensation: Managerial Power versus the Perceived Cost of Stock Op-
tions, 69 U. CH. L. REV. 847 (2002); Tod Perry & Marc Zenner, CEO Compensation in the
1990s: Shareholder Alignment or Shareholder Expropriation?, 35 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 123,
146- 149 (2000).
362. See Bebchuk, supra note 360, at 903.
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aggrandizement. The argument has particular force in the case of
pension funds. Faced with current obligations to beneficiaries, pen-
sion funds have an incentive to insist on an appropriate distribution of
cash reserves. Moreover, those institutional investors actively moni-
toring executive compensation in fact come from the ranks of pension
funds. Some Taft-Hartley funds have played an active role in chal-
lenging excessive executive compensation through shareholder resolu-
tions and public disclosure campaigns. 363 CaIPERS and TIAA-CREF
have well-defined policies on the issue but usually favor the indirect
approach of recommending that the corporate compensation commit-
tees be guided by independent advice.364
3. Responsiveness to Stakeholders
Pension fund managers are tied by the nature of their fiduciary duty
to a strict interpretation of management's duty to maximize share-
holder value.365 No other objective but shareholder wealth maximiza-
tion will serve the interest of funding pension benefits.366 While a
more pluralistic view of corporate objectives continues to be de-
bated, 367 the pension fund community is necessarily allied to the ac-
cepted norm affirming the primacy of the shareholder's economic
interests.
This fiduciary restraint, however, should not bar pension fund man-
agers from responding to the social preferences of their constituents in
two broadly relevant circumstances. First, as Christopher Stone ob-
served: "In the life of the enterprise, there are many occasions on
363. See Randall S. Thomas & Kenneth J. Martin, The Effect of Shareholder Proposals on
Executive Compensation, 67 U. CINN. L. REV. 1021, 1036-1037 (1999); Schwab & Thomas, supra
note 167, at 1086-1088. To encourage shareholder activism by Taft-Hartley funds, the AFL-CIO
publicizes egregious instances of excessive compensation through Executive PayWatch at http://
www.aflcio.org/paywatch.
364. See Thomas & Martin, supra note 363, at 1044. See TIAA-CREF POLICY STATEMENT ON
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, available at www.tiaa-cref.org/about/govemance/ (follow links to
voting.policies). For CalPERS policy statement, see www.calpers-governance/ (follow links to
proxy-voting).
365. The shareholder wealth maximization norm has been described as the "prevailing aca-
demic and business view [of management's fiduciary duty] in the United States." See Mark J.
Roe, The Shareholder Wealth Maximization Norm and Industrial Organization, 149 U. PA. L.
REV 2063, 2065 (2002) It is often traced to Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 684 (1919).
366. See ERISA § 404(a)(1)(A)(i), 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(A)(i) (2007) (explaining that the
fiduciary must act "for the exclusive purpose of... providing benefits to participants and their
beneficiaries").
367. See Thomas W. Dunfee, Corporate Governance in a Market with Morality, 62 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROB., no. 3, 129 (1999); D. Gordon Smith, The Shareholder Primacy Norm, 23 J.
CORP. L. 277 (1998). For an impassioned critique of the shareholder primacy norm, see Marjorie




which the managers have no 'most profitable' option lying on their
desks. Considering the uncertainties in any business environment and
the limited data available to it, there will be some range of choices all
equally consistent with that ill-defined and elusive favorite of the eco-
nomics textbooks, the investment uniquely calculated to maximize the
shareholder's wealth. '368
Within "this profit-undifferentiable range," the duties of pension fi-
duciaries leave them free to favor measures corresponding to their
beneficiaries' social values. For example, work rules and childcare fa-
cilities that serve the needs of working parents involve costs and possi-
ble inefficiencies, but they may help to attract a well qualified work
force. Where the calculus of costs and benefits is uncertain - as it
usually will be - pension fund managers may properly vote for share-
holder proposals affecting parent-employees on the ground that the
beneficiaries favor these proposals. 369 The managers are, of course,
under no duty to do so; they are obliged only to administer pension
benefits. But the welfare of society is served, and the demand for reg-
ulatory controls reduced, whenever a corporation respects the inter-
ests of those affected by its operations. Pension fund managers may
properly encourage such corporate conduct in proxy voting.
Secondly, when corporate executives themselves exceed the scope of
their fiduciary duty by lending the power of the corporation to causes
with a tenuous connection with business operations, pension fund
managers are free to vote in favor of shareholder measures designed
to tell the executives to tend the corporate shop. Such issues com-
monly arise in the context of compelled speech.370 Shareholders (or
368. Christopher D. Stone, Corporate Social Responsibility, What it Might Mean, if it Were
Really to Matter, 71 IOWA L. REV. 557, 568 (1986).
369. O'Connor-Felman advocates the adoption of proxy voting guidelines that favor parental
support policies. See Marleen O'Connor-Felman, American Corporate Governance and Chil-
dren, Investing in Our Future Human Capital During Turbulent Times. 77 S.CAL. L. REV. 1255,
1342-1346 (2004). See also Jaime Koniak, Note, The Impact of Corporate-Sponsored Day Care
on Business in the New Millenium, 2002 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 193 (2002).
Among public pension funds, CalPERS is the only large fund that evaluates labor practices as
a criterion for investment and proxy voting. See Marleen O'Connor, Labor's Role in the Share-
holder Revolution, in WORKING CAPITAL, supra note 123, at 67, 92. Thus, when IBM converted
its defined benefit plan to a cash-balance basis that reduced the benefits of mid-career employ-
ees, CaIPERS supported a shareholder proposal opposing the measure on the ground that it was
bad business policy to alienate a portion of the company's highly trained workforce. See Sanford
M. Jacoby, Employee Representation and Corporate Governance: a Missing Link, 3 U. PA. J.
LAB. & EMP. L. 449, 488 (2001). For a criticism of CaIPERS's social criteria, see Debra J. Mar-
tin, The Public Piggy Bank Goes to Market: Public Pension Fund Investment in Common Stock
and Fund Trustees' Social Agenda, 29 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 39 (1992).
370. Shareholder proposals demanding corporate disclosure of political contributions re-
present a recent tactic by shareholder activists to control undue corporate political influence. See
DAVIS & KIM, supra note 239, at 17. In the past decade, the issue of compelled speech has been
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beneficial owners of corporate equities) may object to the use of their
ownership share to support causes with a questionable connection to
actual business operations. Though pension benefits may be unaf-
fected, the managers are likely to serve the interests of democracy by
acting in accordance with the preferences of their beneficiaries.
4. Externalities
Institutional investors holding securities for the long-term across a
broad cross-section of the economy possess a perspective on economic
externalities - benefits or costs shifted to third parties - that is differ-
ent from that of an individual firm. Hawley and Williams term such
firms "universal owners" and mention large pension funds as exam-
ples.37' Among externalities benefiting third parties, they stress the
importance of employee training and basic research. The individual
firm may find that its investment in employee training is lost when the
employee leaves the firm and that competitors are avoiding this ex-
pense by recruiting employees trained by others. Similarly, the bene-
fits of research work that pushes back the frontiers of scientific
knowledge may be captured by other firms that are adept at adapting
basic scientific knowledge to product development. In the case of
negative externalities, an individual firm can often gain a short-term
cost advantage by shifting environmental damage onto third parties,
but other firms may suffer a portion of the harm, or, more likely, may
incur indirect costs in the form of more burdensome restrictions and
regulations. 372
While universal owners are committed to the maximization of share
value, it is the cumulative, long-term consequences to their entire
portfolio that matters to them. Accordingly, they may rationally favor
investments in employee training and basic research, even though the
costs outweigh the benefits for an individual firm; or they may favor
environmental policies that internalize environmental costs, even
though the policies involve avoidable short-term costs for a particular
presented, most notably, by corporately funded public relations campaigns devoted to climate
change denial and advocacy of social security privatization. See DAVID SIROTA, HOSTILE TAKE-
OVER 130-131 (2006) (writing on social security privatization); Harrington, supra note 240, at
230; Dashka Slater, Confessions of a 401(k) Schizophrenic, MOTHER JONES, May/June 2006, at
70. These issues deserve more detailed analysis, which must be reserved for another article, but
two excellent scholarly contributions should be noted: Alan Hirsch & Ralph Nader, "The Corpo-
rate Conscience" and Other First Amendment Follies in Pacific Gas & Electric, 41 SAN DIEGO L.
REV. 483 (2004); David R. Lagasse, Note, Undue Influence: Corporate Political Speech, Power
and the Initiative Process, 61 BROOK. L. REV. 1347 (1995).
371. HAWLEY & WILLIAMS, supra note 106, at xiv-xv, 3.
372. Id. at 4-7.
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firm. Hawley and Williams see evidence of such a perspective among
some public pension funds, particularly in a new interest in "high per-
formance workplaces" (a code word for well-trained workforces), and
a favorable view of responsible environmental policies. 373 They argue
that the universal owner's perspective on externalities is good for the
economy and ultimately for the health of a democratic society.
5. Strategic Corporate Citizenship
Everyone knows that it can be hard to do the right thing alone but it
is easier when others join in. A remarkable note in the Harvard Law
Review applies this homely wisdom to corporate conduct through a
game theory analysis that reveals many dimensions of the problem
that might otherwise escape our attention.374 Greatly simplified, the
note explains that individual contribution to the public good does not
pay when "all firms share in an equal distribution of the public good
produced by an individual contributor." However, when the benefits
are produced by a "cooperative coalition," they may "outweigh the
cost for individual firms to participate in that coalition [and]... a posi-
tive incentive for individual contribution is formed. Corporate social
responsibility is transformed into strategic corporate citizenship" (ital-
ics added). 375
The classic response to "the destruction of a social good by rampant
individual self-interest is to impose a Hobbesian Leviathan. ' 376 The
Sarbanes-Oxley Act is a version of this response. "The alternative to
Leviathan control is to cultivate a set of self-enforcing institutions to
encourage strategic corporate citizenship. ' 377 Such institutions must
be designed to foster "open communication, trust, and trans-
parency," 378 to assign market value to good citizenship, and to impose
costs on destructive conduct. Under favorable circumstances, it may
be possible to internalize a norm of corporate citizenship throughout
an industry. If "a critical mass of firms" take the first step, "a cascade
of firms" will sometimes follow. 379 Thus, a decade after "Lotus Devel-
opment Corporation became the first publicly traded company to of-
373. Id. at 21-28.
374. Note, Finding Strategic Corporate Citizenship: A New Game Theoretic View, 117 HARV.
L. REV. 1957 (2004).
375. Id. at 1968-1969.
376. Id. at 1973.
377. Id. at 1974.
378. Ibid.
379. Id. at 1978.
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fer domestic partner benefits," the practice had become widespread
throughout society.380
Pension funds are well-suited by their wide holdings in the economy
and relatively long-term perspective to play a part in the set of self-
enforcing institutions, described in the note, which can support the
practice of strategic corporate citizenship. For the sake of industry-
wide benefits, the funds have an incentive to encourage transparency,
to favor cooperative pursuit of ethical norms,381 and to monitor firms
for deviations from standards of citizenship.
C. The Prospects of Corporate Self-regulation
Descending now from the realm of theory to a more practical plane,
it must be recognized that the potential value of a pension plan voice
can be realized only in the context of a stronger shareholder-based
system of corporate self-regulation. In the present world of corporate
governance, a pension plan voice, even if amplified somewhat, can
have no more than a modest impact on corporate decision making.
We have seen that corporate self-regulation comes with a difficult pre-
condition - it requires some separation of power within the corpora-
tion. In the absence of such a division of power, shareholders will
remain suppliants at the gates of corporate power, invited in only on
rare occasions when shareholder approval is needed for corporate
restructuring.
Are institutional shareholders with diversified holdings capable of
sustaining an effective system of corporate monitoring? The question
has been asked in a debate initiated some fifteen years ago on the
possibility of more effective relational investing by shareholders.
Apart from those who prefer the current separation of ownership and
control, there are skeptics who question whether effective shareholder
monitoring is possible. Two of the most insightful of the skeptics are
John Coffee, Jr., and Iman Anabtawi. Coffee argues that many insti-
tutional investors face an inevitable tradeoff between liquidity and
380. Ibid.
381. A variety of institutions now exist to encourage corporate conformance to norms of so-
cially responsible behavior. They include Coalition for Environmentally Responsible Economies
(CERES) (a common reporting format for environmental stewardship), Social Accountability
8000 (a uniform system to evaluate labor practices), Forest Stewardship Council (a program to
monitor forestry practices) and the Convention for Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Offi-
cials in International Business Transactions. See Claire Moore Dickerson, Human Rights: The
Emerging Norm of Corporate Social Responsibility, 76 TUL. L. REV. 1431 (2002); Douglas M.
Branson, Corporate Social Responsibility Redux, 76 TUL. L. REV. 1207 (2002).
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control.382 If the investor desires a relationship with management
conferring influence or a degree of control, it must maintain a sub-
stantial holding over the long-term, thereby sacrificing the liquidity of
its investment. Most institutional investors, including open-end mu-
tual funds, banks, and insurance companies, have a distinct preference
for liquidity because "their shareholders, depositors, or policyholders
can withdraw their funds on short notice. ' '383 Pension funds are not
subject to the same demands for liquidity, but any potential they
might have for corporate monitoring is nullified by the extremely di-
versified nature of their holdings and the practice of delegating invest-
ment decisions to money managers or, worse, to a number of
competing money managers. 384 Possessing relatively small invest-
ments in individual firms and typically placing these investments
under the control of money managers, pension funds have insufficient
financial incentive to incur the costs of effective monitoring or con-
certed action that might increase their influence with management. 385
Coffee sees the so-called activism of public pension funds as consisting
largely of staged confrontations, performed for political reasons that
have little actual substance. 386
It should be added that Coffee sees a value in more effective share-
holder monitoring and to this end he advocates selective deregulation
and certain other measures mentioned in this article. 387 He merely
doubts that the deregulation thesis "takes us very far", 388 and appears
to harbor the same skepticism of other suggested reforms. In contrast,
Anabtawi takes a negative view of enhanced shareholder power. He
begins with an assumption of this article: "shareholders presently have
the potential to operate as only a weak constraint on managers.
389
He argues that the "deep rifts" among shareholders are a cause, and
in fact a justification, for this weak level of influence of individual
shareholders. 390 He identifies "five schisms that place the interests of
some shareholders in conflict with those of other shareholders": (1)
short-term versus long-term shareholders, (2) universal owners with
diversified economy-wide holdings versus undiversified shareholders,
382. See Coffee, supra note 9, at 1281-1289; John C. Coffee, Jr., The Folklore of Investor Capi-
talism, 95 MICH. L. REV. 1970, 1985 (1997) [hereinafter Coffee (1997)].
383. Coffee, supra note 9, at 1318.
384. Id. at 1336-1342.
385. Id. at 1283, 1326; Coffee (1997), supra note 382, at 1976-1978.
386. Id. at 1978.
387. See also Coffee, supra note 50 and note 58.
388. Coffee, supra note 339, at 1280.
389. Anabtawi, supra note 336, at 570.
390. Id. at 564.
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(3) employee and executive shareholders versus outside shareholders,
(4) public and union pension funds with non-economic interests versus
other shareholders, and (5) hedge funds investing in equity derivatives
and other financial contracts versus the ordinary shareholder.391 "In
certain political contexts," he acknowledges, parties with divergent in-
terests can engage in "logrolling" or the exchange of votes in order to
secure some approximation of the common interests.392 He assumes
that no such mechanism exists in the corporate sphere. As a conse-
quence, any additional power conferred on shareholders will have the
harmful effect of enabling them to pursue private interests that are
inevitably at odds with "overall shareholder welfare." 393
While Coffee is an eminently credible scholar, I suggest that his
skepticism might be tempered by the consideration that innovation
may encourage further innovation. The shareholder passivity pro-
duced by dispersion of ownership and investment turnover rests on a
cost/benefit calculation. An initial reform, or institutional innovation,
may alter the calculation by making monitoring more effective or less
costly - thus stimulating further innovations. Reforms, in other
words, can open opportunities for further innovations and strengthen
past innovations. After all, the weak self-regulatory effects of the ex-
isting system are due in large measure to two institutional innovations
in the past quarter century - the development of proxy voting advis-
ers and the growth of socially responsible investing. Both offer the
promise of further development. The reforms suggested in this article
would in fact have the effect of increasing the market for professional
proxy advisers, and an expanded market for these services might lead
to greater variety and effectiveness.
For his part, Anabtawi dismisses too easily the possibility of "log
rolling" in the corporate governance sphere. In fact, there are now
mechanisms that serve to unite disparate groups of shareholders. We
have noted that the small group of Taft-Hartley funds pursues rela-
tively conservative proxy voting tactics for which it can find support
among the larger body of public pension funds. The Council of Insti-
tutional Investors, composed of 130 pension funds with equity hold-
ings of approximately $1,500 billion, serves to give this implicit
coalition an institutional glue.3 94 The proxy advisory services are also
coalition builders. As profit-making businesses, they have an incen-
391. Id. at 593.
392. Id. at 595.
393. Id. at 565.
394. See www.cii.org/about/. The estimate of $1,500 assumes that one half of the members'
assets consist of equities.
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tive to appeal to the largest possible market, thereby forming coali-
tions among their prospective customers. Unlike Anabtawi, I see
nothing harmful in broad coalitions held together by institutional ties.
They may potentially evolve into something resembling political par-
ties - an outcome that would greatly facilitate the expression of a
shareholder voice. 395
I will refrain from expanding this article with a discussion of other
avenues toward corporate self-regulation. Complex issues lose co-
gency if briefly sketched and are best left to another article. It is im-
portant, however, to recognize that we have pursued the narrow
perspective of a particular shareholder group, without considering in-
stitutional means of integrating a shareholder voice into the corporate
decision-making process. Clearly the strengthening of a shareholder
voice and the creation of an effective feedback mechanism are mutu-
ally reinforcing strategies; both must be addressed to fundamentally
alter the cost/benefit calculus involved in shareholder monitoring.
IV. CONCLUSION
In tracing institutional constraints that contribute to the marginal-
ization of pension plans in the forum of corporate governance, we
have found that the most important issues relate to the fiduciary struc-
ture of pension plans under ERISA. The British Pension Act 1995
offers a compelling model for reform. Other significant constraints
include the phenomenon of redundant regulation, the Taft-Hartley
Act, and the proxy voting arrangements of the Federal Employees
Retirement System.
At present, the prospects of corporate self-regulation are uncertain,
but the guidelines for creating systems of corporate self-regulation do
represent an alternative to the kind of Hobbesian controls exemplified
by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and point in the direction of a more demo-
cratic society. For those who value this objective, it is important to
craft corporate reforms in a manner that will strengthen internal sepa-
rations of power and the variety of information available to corporate
decision making. This article is offered as a contribution to that end.
395. See Michael E. Murphy, Dispelling TINA's Ghost from the Post-Enron Corporate Gov-
ernance Debate, 43 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 63 (2002) (TINA is the British acronym for Margaret
Thatcher's favorite expression: "there is no alternative.").
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